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Abstract

This Exegesis outlines how the multimedia exhibition, Voices,
will represent the physical constraints and psychological
realities in Iraq, under which journalists and civil-society
organizations work. The multimedia exhibition on freedom of
expression (FOE) in Iraq is contextualized in this Exegesis.
Both this Exegesis and the exhibition itself demonstrate that
the Iraqi struggle for FOE remains slow and fraught with
difficulties. The exhibition and Exegesis aim to show the ‘real
life’ challenges that media workers experience in post-conflict
Iraq, set against the contextual backdrop of the “Arab Spring”
uprisings in 2011.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background of Voices

This MA-R comprises the exhibition Voices and this Exegesis to
contextualize and background the exhibition.

The multimedia

exhibition Voices is comprised of photographs and video taken
within the International Zone (IZ) in Baghdad during the course
of my work in Iraq. Voices utilizes audio and visual material,
and print, to reflect the energy of the dialogue of the media
and activists as they rallied for their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression (FOE) and freedom of information (FOI)
throughout 2011. This occurred against the backdrop of Iraq’s
controversially named “Arab Spring” uprisings.

The exhibition represents an intersection of information,
between publicly recorded fact concerning policy and politics
and the impact of their application on Iraq and various
stakeholders. Voices also reflects the dislocation of working in
the International Zone (IZ), a reality discussed in this
Exegesis.

1

Transmitting the full scope and complexity of the impact of the
barriers placed upon FOE and FOI as they stood in Iraq in 2011
is virtually impossible in an exhibition format alone. The
remaining chapters of this document explain key aspects of this
complexity, and present the main political, social and cultural
implications of these constraints. The effects of this
attenuation of freedom are also evident in the dialogue between
Iraqi media professionals, activists and policy makers.

Naturally, the curtailment of freedom is evident by omission and
it is carefully recorded in news clippings, blogs and various
pieces of legislation. The exhibition includes excerpts of this
data as a collage of the points of view, reactions and actions
as they occurred throughout 2011, in an effort to reflect the
social dimensions of the discourse.

On another level, Voices attempts to mitigate or address
inaccurate notions many outsiders, including Australians, may
have about Iraq. Australians and other Westerners have a
tendency to describe the country in wide brush-strokes, using
labels such as ‘Islamic’, ‘fundamental’ and ‘extreme’, seeing
Iraq as a place of violence and terrorism, or even as the ‘axis
of evil’. Discourses from the mainstream media tend to disregard
the civil aspects of Iraqi culture and society while
2

overlooking, or lacking access to, the direct voices of Iraqis
(as opposed to those of Western troops) in witnessing their own
suffering and dedication to establishing a democratic state and
peace that reflects international principles and norms.

Much of this Exegesis, as background, is fact-driven and cannot
on its own express the intensity felt by ordinary Iraqi
citizens, activists, and media professionals campaigning for
their human right to protest and air grievances. It does,
however, explain the legislative and political landscape that
has shaped the way FOE was applied in Iraq in 2011. FOE was
defined as an internationally recognized human right under
Article 19 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) as adopted in 1948:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.

In working to support FOE, we must examine the international
conventions and treaties, analyses and reports that adhere to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and their application.
3

Imposing such conventions requires consultation with Iraqis
while simultaneously gaining a preliminary understanding of
contemporary Iraq’s unique sociopolitical ‘system’.

Scope and limitations of Voices: The researcher and the
researched

Voices explores the connections between establishment and
government policy that encourages free media in Iraq, with the
everyday insecurities of journalists. The project draws on
direct experience of working within Iraq and specifically with
the news media community. I apply this expertise to define and
evaluate how patterns within the media, and the environment in
which media operates, are working towards or against generally
accepted international standards and practices of information
accessibility. Although I am not a human rights lawyer or a
political analyst, I have been involved in media and human
rights issues and the Middle East in various capacities since
1999. This provides a unique perspective for the exhibition’s
content and potential impact.

I hope that by using an exhibition format, a far more humane
understanding of the complexities and after effects of the Iraq
war will be evident, and that audiences will walk away with
4

reverberations of the cries, pleads, and intelligent discourse
of Iraqis young and old, women and men, academics and activists,
all fighting for their right to express themselves.

Although in this Exegesis and in the multimedia exhibition I
have made every effort to present material directly from Iraqi
individuals and documents, it is useful to spend a few moments
describing my background so as to provide readers with insight
into any residual biases or filters evident in this work.

In 2009, I began working for UNESCO, and in January 2010 moved
to Amman as a project manager with UNESCO Iraq's Communication
and Information Sector in media development, where I was
mandated with defending FOE. It was in this UNESCO job that I
realized that information equals power. The degree of power
depends on the degree of flow of information, how it is
transmitted and how accessible it is, and the inevitable impact
it will have on a country's constituency. Information
availability affects an individual’s ability to make informed
decisions and to participate actively in democratic decisionmaking processes.

While conducting the research for this paper, I worked for the
United Nations Humanitarian Affairs Sector in Baghdad in the
5

fields of communication and advocacy, where I applied my
expertise to the development and sustainability of media
pluralism in the developing world.

As a multimedia exhibition, Voices aims to bring this experience
from Iraq back to Australia, providing understandings of local
Iraqi participation in fighting for FOE. I hope to provide my
audience with a sense of the intensity and frequency of the
discourse of civil society and media on this topic. This
Exegesis, and the associated Voices exhibition, aims to
highlight the importance of local participation in policy change
and the actual effect of government crackdowns on civilians.

Research challenges to the current work include having limited
access to stakeholders outside of the IZ; my inability to speak,
read, or write Arabic (though professional translation was
used); and the fact that I was a white Australian female
researching freedom of expression in a culturally and
politically fractious, post-conflict environment.

With these limitations taken into account, Voices also aims to
deconstruct my experience of the various constraints imposed by
factors such as security and the physical and psychological
isolation of working within the United Nations in Iraq. The
6

exhibition will relate my lived experience in engaging with
myriad issues surrounding freedom of expression, as experienced
by Iraqi journalists and citizens living on the other side of
the T-walls (blast walls).

In addition, Voices will include excerpts from a journal I kept
beginning on 10 February 2011, marking the dawn of the “Arab
Spring” uprisings in Baghdad and other Governorates. This
journal includes the equivalent of more than 500 pages of
documented human rights violations against media, bloggers and
activists (with all identifiable sources removed). In the
exhibition, the journal is displayed alongside declassified
artifacts collected on US military bases throughout 2010 and
prior to the military draw-down in December 2011.

The fragmentation of Voices works as a metaphor for the
encumbrances that push down upon the people of Iraq.
Fragmentation is multiplicity and denotes the difficulties of
representation in a jarring, confusing and imploding Iraq.

Rationale for the multimedia exhibition format

Voices is presented as a simulation of a mini-prison (IZ) within
the context of a multi-media exhibition. This reconstruction
7

reflects the security constraints of working in a war zone while
giving voice to the Iraqi uprisings as they occurred throughout
2011. Voices uses the dialogue present in 2011 in the local
Iraqi press, social media platforms, YouTube, twitter, and so on
— voices that Western audiences have rarely, if ever, heard.

The purpose of using a multimedia approach for the exhibition is
to mirror the local discourse as it was experienced at the time
— across various media platforms. This multidimensional approach
also supports the exhibition’s educational component, as it
communicates some of the factual content found in the remaining
Chapters of this document (such as political attitudes and
trends in the area of civil liberties and media law, and their
application) through snippets of conversation, debate and
physical documentation. Or, to put it more simply, through the
lived experiences of Iraqis as conveyed in the exhibition.

This multi-dimensionality also serves to reflect the key
approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which, with
Participatory Action Research (PAR), frames this work on a
theoretical level. ‘Linguistic units’ existing as isolated
examples of discourse, artifacts or trends are not the normative
choice in CDA and PAR, instead, ‘studying the social phenomena
which are necessarily complex’ – which contribute to an issue
8

such as FOE in Iraq – …‘require a multi-disciplinary and multimethodical approach (Wodak and Meyer 2008, p.2).’

At the time, there was a sense of great urgency, intelligence
and frequency of discourse or ‘chatter’ surrounding civil rights
pertaining in broad to FOE throughout 2011. Voices is intended,
in part, to unsettle the audience through presenting the new and
degraded reality at the close of 2011: the breadth and scope of
a seemingly retrograde motion in Iraq in terms of the
development of FOE in that region. The liveliness, defiance and
the commitment shown by Iraqi bloggers, news media and social
activists was not apparent in traditional Western news coverage
of events in Iraq during this period, and thus – to the author’s
knowledge – was not transferred to audiences living and working
outside of Iraq, and, the media development profession.

Voices will make accessible and bring to life the conclusions
reached in this document in an effort to increase understanding
of these issues for an Australian audience largely unfamiliar
with and geographically removed from Iraq and its social and
political concerns. Subsequent chapters of this Exegesis analyze
and document human rights violations, legislative practices, the
sociopolitical context, the current state of media practice, and
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the role new media and political foment have played in Iraq
since 2011.

Rationale for the structure of the Exegesis

This Exegesis is structured to present necessary background and
historical information about FOE/FOI in Iraq, insight into
recent and current related legislation and legislative action,
and — most critically — direct quotes from Iraqi citizens who
have expressed themselves at grave risk of punitive actions in
their own country.

The topic of FOE/FOI in Iraq today is complicated, fractious,
and unfamiliar to many outside the Middle East (or those who
study it). In order to describe this environment to readers, the
Exegesis begins by providing rationale and important information
on theory, method, and related research, and by providing
critical information about the historical, political, and social
context of the topic of FOE/FOI in Iraq.

This is crucial for a

contextualization of the approach to realizing Voices, as being
determined by a very particular set of constraints in which the
research was conducted. Furthermore, it is from this background
that the implications and nuances of the direct quotes from
Iraqis can be contextualized in later sections of the work, in
10

particular, Chapter Six which focuses on macro-level
insecurities faced daily by media professionals.

When the research for this Exegesis began in mid-2010, it was
intended to use PAR (Participatory Action Research) as a ‘live’
and ‘consultative’ research mechanism in its most fundamental
form. And this was made possible through high delivery Internet
fibre optics (as laid by the J6 Battalion, USFI) with
unrestricted access – facilitating an interactive dialogue
between researcher and researched.

However, with the uprising

that began in January 2011 that marked the “Arab Spring”, the
already-fragile security situation became even more tenuous. It
has steadily unraveled to the point where Iraq now (2013) stands
at the brink of civil war – just as it was in 2007 and 2008.
Therefore, except for the Internet access, PAR as a method was
no longer feasible as community action, dialogue and shared
ownership of a research process – all components of PAR – were
no longer possible in the dialectical process necessary for fair
representation.

Due to the disintegration of security; access to sources through
open interview, and the ability to travel outside the IZ, or
invite my sources into the UN compound was increasingly fraught
with difficulty and at times impossible. There was an imperative
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to shift the design of the Exegesis to use the underlying
principles of PAR as a guide, and move the focus from active
engagement to discourse analysis and so mirror the new direction
in which the data would be presented; the new focus now
positioning the viewer as discerning audience to a verbatim,
lived conversation.

It was important that the power of language

and representation were made evident by way of discourse
analysis, and that I did not colour the work with simply more of
the usual ‘colonialist’ rhetoric.

My resolve has always been to present Iraqi civil society in a
sympathetic manner and that I have actively countered Western
notions of ‘Iraq’, and of the ‘Other’.

Thus it was essential to

include chapters that explain the context within which freedom
of expression is practiced in Iraq today.

In an effort to bring

the Iraq story to the public domain, I have drawn and
extrapolated from all existing texts about FOE in Iraq to
support my own lived observations.

Many of these texts are

internal UN and INGO documents, and some exist only off the
record (and are cited as such); these, through this work, are
now accessible to the public.

A significant portion of the background material presented here
offers an analysis of the current legal framework of Iraq as it
12

relates to freedom of expression and information. Furthermore, I
acknowledge the effect of the post-invasion ‘hangover’ that can
be attributed to the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) and
interim government. The laws analyzed were often sent to me by
parliamentary members, or media staff who must remain anonymous.
These laws were translated and shared with concerned actors
within the international community for analysis and subsequent
presentation to the government.

In these analyses, the leading FOE and FOI lawyers were
consulted, such as David Banisar, Sejal Parmar (ARTICLE 19) and
Toby Mendel (Center for Law and Democracy). Mendel also acts as
an additional mentor to my research, and I have consulted with
him extensively regarding the analysis of media law presented in
this document. Only one draft law presented within this Exegesis
has been approved by parliament; the others are awaiting second
readings, or are in the process of amendment.

Thus it is not

possible to present a more detailed and finite analysis and what
I present here is complete and correct as of the beginning of
2012.

Throughout this work, I have strived to be vigilant about
excising my own voice and minimizing the impact of my own
filters. This effort is a central concept of participatory
13

action research (PAR) methodology, as is its agenda of directing
research into emancipatory dialogue; the main aim influencing
this project. By deferring to PAR as the heuristic impetus that
frames this research, I draw on CDA as its complementary
theoretical partner in order to strengthen the unpacking of the
relationship between language and power as a direct reflection
of the relationship that exists in Iraq between the citizen, the
journalist and the gatekeepers of the free flow of information.
I am inspired by PAR’s underlying goal - to emancipate community
and level the playing field between those who are
disenfranchised and the structures of power – and did my utmost
to liberate the ‘voices’ of dissenting Iraqi citizens. This was
a key methodology and framing mechanism to shape the
presentation of my research in this Exegesis and in the
multimedia exhibition. I have taken on a political position that
overtly defends those whom the power elite in Iraq seek to
oppress.

For this I make no apology.

Rationale for the research methodologies

Although this research relies on the tenets of participatory
action research (PAR) as its central framework, the project is
not ‘pure’ PAR in terms of interactivity and consultation, for
two main reasons. First and most importantly, the volatile and
14

degrading environment in Baghdad precluded my being able to
involve Iraqis fully and directly in the design, implementation,
or analysis of the research; such involvement – while ideal –
could have cost them their freedom or even their lives. Second,
this project was influenced by discourse and news media analysts
whose theoretical approaches can be seen to be, on principle,
most closely aligned with

PAR (most notably Habermas, and van

Dijk), and the social commentators Said, Fisk and Hass, all of
whom address the complex and nuanced landscape of the
interrelation between power and the free or democratic flow of
information.

Moreover, they ask two critical questions: (1)

where, in all of this — within the context of the political and
physical suppression of freedom of expression and information —
does the researcher posit him or herself, and (2) is there an
outstanding obligation to subvert impartiality in order to
sympathize and defend individuals’ fundamental human right to
express opinion without retribution?

All of this will be

discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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Theoretical basis for the exhibition’s audio-artistic structure

Prior to looking at PAR and CDA in greater detail - in order to
understand the aims of the exhibition, its physical construction
and its content, - it is helpful to first investigate the
structural presentation, the architectural and practical choices
I made as informed by art and communications theories that
influence its physical form, and intended message. Communication
theory, semiotics, and visual sociology all contribute to the
goal of understanding the architecture of Voices’ presentation
style. These theories all share a similar narrative, one that
implies that content in any medium, when transferred, is
inherently imbued with meaning that will be decoded by its
audience in certain ways depending on both common (shared) and
individual (unique) socio-cultural experiences and background.

While these relative and interrelated theories of communication
explain how meanings are created and subsequently deconstructed,
PAR looks at the ‘action’ of how information can be presented to
an audience in a way that supports the democratization of
knowledge or research. PAR also reflects on — and can be used to
frame — what messages or meaning the researcher consciously
intends to pass on. While the emancipatory nature of PAR
provides a methodology or ‘raison d'être’ for the research, the
16

communication theories discussed here inform the way content is
managed physically within the exhibition format.

Communication Theory
Communication theory evolved for the critical analysis of art as
it became increasingly influenced by the industrial machine age
(around the time of the London 1851 Great Exposition), and
shortly after that, in what is known as the age of mechanical
reproduction. The realms of communication theory and semantics
intertwine, one acting as medium and the latter as message.

In both communication theory and semiotic discourse, ‘text’ can
refer to any cultural artifact or object, such as photography,
film, sound recordings or typography. Several levels of
communication can be identified. The first addresses technical
communication and explores the systems we use to encode and
decode messages. The second level is semantics, which refers to
the precise ways we use language, codes, or symbols to convey
intended meaning. The third level addresses to the effectiveness
of the message: does the message affect behavior in the intended
way (Baldwin & Roberts 2006). Communication theory, like
semiotic discourse, suggests that communication is not a process
where meaning is passed from one point to another, but rather a

17

relationship between the production and reading of meaning
(Baldwin & Roberts 2006).

Text — in the case of this exhibition, the Iraqi voices
presented in juxtaposition to the photographs — is an object.
The signs accompanying the exhibit have two levels of meaning,
according to semiotic theory. The first is unintended (the
text’s denotation), and appears at the time that the object is
produced or made; the second is the one understood (the text’s
connotation) at the time that the audience reads it. With
photographs, Barthes (1977, p. 19) argues:

The paradox can then be seen as the co-existence of two
messages, the one without a code, the other with a code;
structurally, the paradox is clearly not the collusion of a
denoted message and a connoted message, it is that here the
connoted (or coded) message develops on the basis of a
message without a code.

Semiotic Theory
In semiotic theory, the signifier is the photograph (or object),
and the signified may be the combination of text (byline or
caption) and image, with meanings inferred by the reader. Often,
what is signified is culturally specific. According to Umberto
18

Eco (quoted in Baldwin & Roberts 2006, p. 35), ‘meaning is
determined by social aspects (race, gender, class, etc.)’. This
can create misunderstandings, then, if readers arrive from
different backgrounds that lead them to interpret material
through a different lens.

As film narrative, Voices uses the photograph as backdrop and
the text as foreground. The relationship between the two — the
physical act of curating or organizing the data in relation to
each other — will transmit meaning. The intention was to curate
Voices in a way that deconstructs, or even subverts the meaning,
of any signifiers supporting mainstream Western notions of Iraq,
its people, or its culture as Orientalized or dehumanized.
Instead, in a reflexive way, I hope to show the humanity,
vibrancy, intensity, and political engagement of Iraqis in their
efforts to challenge the restrictions imposed on them as they
exercise the same human rights that we take for granted in
Australia. However, as much as I aspire to a completely
unbiased, scientific presentation of information, I recognize
that meaning ultimately will be created and categorized by the
viewer according to multiple cultural and social factors. I
accept that different interpretations of understanding are
likely to occur.

19

Baldwin and Roberts (2006, p. 38) take this as a given:
‘semiotics recognizes the potential for aberrant reading as a
norm rather than an exception’, reminding us that ‘meaning is
created the moment the text is read, not when it is written’ —
or, as in our case, posted on YouTube or Facebook, tweeted, or
released as an official report.

Communication, then, can be seen as an ideological process in
the sense that an object’s value is decided from within the
social and cultural context that produced it. Naturally,
communication as an ideological process can be used to justify a
certain balance of power, as Baldwin and Roberts (2006, p. 41)
noted when discussing Marxism: ‘In Marxism, ideology is the
process by which ideas and the world views of the dominant
social groups are accepted as true’, going on to state that
societies ‘operate within an economic system that serves the
purposes of these groups and maintains their dominance’. Teun
van Dijk (1995) echoes this view in his discourse on mass
communication, outlining the relationship between the structures
of power and discourse, and the role of communication in
perpetuating cultural and political hegemony. In its simplest
expression, information is power — a fact not lost on those in
power, who at times take extreme measures to limit everyone
else’s access to information. This analysis informs the
20

following chapters of this thesis. It is also the reason why I
strove to give a platform for Iraqis, a ‘speaker’s corner’ – to
be exhibited to a Western audience - so that their ‘voices’ can
be heard beyond the physical, political, social and security
constraints imposed on them in situ in 2011, and to an extent to
counter the imposition of our own constraints of understanding
due to our tendency to ‘brand’ the ‘other’.

The pernicious and

undermining nature of ‘labeling’ and ‘blanket stereotyping’ will
be expanded upon towards the end of this Chapter in the subsections that refer to the work of Robert Fisk and Edward Said.

Visual Sociology
Just as the analytical approach of semiotic discourse aims to
deconstruct sociopolitical meanings within cultural production
systems, visual sociology is a collection of approaches in which
researchers use photographs to portray, describe, or analyze
social phenomena.

Visual sociology can be broken down into two major approaches.
The first, employed in the current project, involves using
photographs in the conventional sense of data gathering. In the
second approach, visual sociologists study photographs produced
by the culture (for instance, images in advertising, newspapers,
magazines, or family photo albums), thus exploring the semiotics
21

or ‘sign systems’ in a culture or context, or a culture’s
communication systems. Harper (2001, p. 55) offers a clear
distinction between the two approaches by stating that ‘some
sociologists take photographs to study the social world, whereas
others analyze photographs others have taken in
institutionalized occupational settings or in their family
lives’. Borrowing Harper’s terms, I have taken photographs and
used various (non-photographic) media sourced from the public
domain to record and study the social world of Iraq in 2011, in
an attempt to expand the current dialogue among Australians
regarding FOE and FOI in contemporary Iraq.

In his explanation of the various modes of sociological research
(scientific, phenomenological, narrative, and reflexive), Harper
(2001, p. 60) notes:

The differences between these approaches are partly in the
relationship between the researcher and the data. In the
scientific mode, the sociologist looks outside his or her
experience for data; as a phenomenologist, the sociologist
looks within for knowledge. The narrator structures data to
analyze social life as social process, and the reflexive
sociologist seeks data in the expression of the subject.

22

All four modes of sociological research are evident in Voices. I
have collected data from outside my experience in a social
science capacity, and structured it into a narrative that
describes lived reality only.

This has positioned me in

relationship to my research. I have endeavored to minimize any
personal biases in data selection or presentation, and I have
collated and presented the data from the point of view of the
researched — the Iraqi voices.

The insights gained from this research process have enabled an
examination of public, and private, domain discourse (although
the authors remain anonymous) related to the democratization of
information and communication in Iraq with a focus on freedom of
expression and freedom of information and their implications for
related human rights issues. The latter chapters consider the
current upheaval in the region, the widespread demonstrations,
and the use of new media in facilitating protest.

Initial Primary research approach: participatory action research
(PAR)

Initially, this project drew upon participatory action research
(PAR), a research approach that strives to acknowledge any
advantage or power disparity between the researcher and the
23

research subjects. Bohane (2007, p. 27) explains that this is
accomplished through the application of three guiding
assumptions:

1) that twenty-first century democracies should empower all
citizens and not only a privileged elite, 2) that social
science research is almost never morally or politically
disinterested, and 3) that maintaining separation between
research and practice is inefficient and may in fact lead
to false findings.

In an ideal world this research would have continued within a
PAR framework, however as Iraq deteriorated into a security
nightmare, PAR could no longer be used in its fullest
traditional applications, excluding interactions over the
Internet.

PAR focuses on the center of the community and the

voices of the people, and is acutely aware that knowledge and
the way the flow of information is managed can form the basis of
power structures within a society. It ‘… reflects questioning
about the nature of knowledge and the extent to which knowledge
can represent the interests of those in power and reinforce
their positions in society’ (Habermas 1971).
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PAR is particularly useful when a researcher is a professional
already embedded in the system being studied, and when operating
from a Western vantage point in analyzing FOE and FOI in the
ethnically, religiously, and culturally charged setting of Iraq
and the surrounding region. Any analysis of the region must take
into account the unprecedented suffering and socioeconomic and
political instability of post-conflict communities struggling to
recover, and PAR’s baseline tenet — the active participation of
subjects in giving them their own voices rather than studying
them from a clinical distance — was central in my aim to be
inclusive while removing myself from the position of a
prescriptive, ‘all knowing’ author.

Deferring to PAR was also an attempt to counter the ‘top-down’
approach and the presumed role of ‘international expert’ (as an
employee of the UN) assessing the rights and wrongs of countryspecific socio-political landscapes and determining agendas and
delivery of the correct ‘aid’. The international response and
development agendas relating to freedom of the press as they
have occurred in the past in other post-conflict scenarios will
be discussed in the case study of Bosnia and Kosovo in Chapter
3.

The purpose here (Chapter 3) is to articulate a discussion

on the establishment of a free media in a post-conflict society,
and, in drawing upon the experiences there in terms of the UN,
25

UNESCO and other agencies. There are strong similarities in the
responses of local media to global intervention that aim to
deliberately build up free press as part of ‘democratization’
and ‘reconstruction’.

As a nascent research methodology, PAR developed out of the
framework of social psychology in the early 1930s and continued
to evolve over subsequent decades. Kemmis and McTaggart (2007,
p. 272) discuss the early development of PAR:

Action research began with an idea attributed to social
psychologist Kurt Lewin. It first found expression in the
work of the Tavistok Institute of Human Relations in the
United Kingdom. … A second generation of action research,
building on the British Tradition of action research in
organizational development … began in Britain with the Ford
Teaching Project directed by John Elliot and Clem Adam.

PAR finally emerged in its current form to make the connection
between critical emancipator action research and participatory
action research. Kemmis and McTaggart (2007, p. 272) note that
this new focus in PAR emerged simultaneously with major social
movements:
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… in the developing world, including those championed by
Paulo Freire, Orlando Fals Borda, Rajesh Tandon, Anisur
Rahman, and Marja-Liisa Swantz as well as by North American
and British workers in adult education and literacy,
community development, and development studies.

One of the key themes that emerged in PAR — the need for
participatory action researchers to connect their work to
broader social movements — is particularly applicable to the
current project. However, while the research aspired to the
principles of PAR, the reality in Iraq impinged on the research
to the extent that a full PAR action plan was not possible.

Why use PAR as a methodology to frame our understanding of FOE
in Iraq, and why apply PAR to the physical transference of fact
to exhibition? The answer is straightforward: participatory
research is based in social research, social life, and is
attributed to being ‘associated with social transformation in
the Third World’ (Kemmis & McTaggart 2007, p. 273).

Beyond this, three specific criteria are found in action
research: ‘shared ownership of research projects, communitybased analysis of social problems, and an orientation towards
community action’ (Kemmis & McTaggart 2007, p. 273). The present
27

research and the subsequent direction, as outlined in the
Exegesis, had to take a best fit plan to incorporate the third
of these criteria only (community action).

The criteria of

shared ownership of the design and community-based analysis were
virtually impossible due to the very grave risks to Iraqis,
coupled with my physical separation from them within the walls
of the IZ.

Community action mirrors the broader social discourse
surrounding FOE in Iraq against the backdrop of the “Arab
Spring” uprisings. According to McTaggart (2002), participation
is necessary in the objectification of experience and the
disciplining of subjectivity. As the researcher, I was in a
privileged position as an international person working in Iraq.
I had the responsibility of engaging with and upholding FOE and
human rights principles, but did so from behind a web of
security protection, kudos, and international clout, all of
which combined effectively to distance me from danger and
hardship, as well as from physical access to Iraqis. I was, to
some degree, physically removed from the challenges faced daily
by Iraqis trying to exercise their constitutional human rights.
It was an uneven playing field on which it would have been easy
for me to act as the expert, editor, and director, offering my
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audience elitist and prescriptive definitions of right and
wrong.

These tensions are present in any research, but they are made
more challenging while living on opposite sides of blast walls,
with armed forces on both sides. The PAR approach inspired me to
do everything I safely could do to represent any and all
communications from Iraqis without editing, filtering, or
selecting them in any significant way. For example, in compiling
material for the multimedia exhibition, I used all
communications from randomly selected sources, but within a
linear narrative, and selecting those excerpts I believed would
best speak to the audience about the gravity of the reality as I
know it to be in Iraq. Ultimately it was an effort to compress
time and let the ‘chatter’ of Iraqis burst through to illustrate
the seriousness of the daily challenges and events beyond their
control.

Voices embodies the vibrant discourse of Iraqi citizens, whether
they are journalists, activists, legislators, or members of
civil society. Voices showcases these parties as active players
in an ongoing sociopolitical process. The exhibition honors the
goal of PAR in drawing ‘attention to the importance of “data”
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and the informed use of relevant literatures in action research’
(McTaggart 2002, p. 5).

Having recognized the logistical limitations encountered in
doing PAR in Baghdad, PAR is nevertheless a highly appropriate
approach for this project. At its core, PAR asserts that
pluralistic ethical discourse should recognize the pre-existing
legitimacy of all people, privileging honor, local laws and
customs, culture, ethnicity, and religious beliefs while
incorporating international law and civil and human rights as
inscribed in covenants and international agreements. As a
participatory or inclusive theory, PAR represents the
theoretical antithesis of the incumbent Iraqi government’s
attitude towards the civil rights of the Iraqi people, as this
Exegesis makes clear. Just as the media and civil society in
Iraq are demanding change, the ‘aim of participatory action
research is to change the individual and collective practices,
social structures, and social media which maintain
irrationality, injustice, and incoherent and unsatisfactory
forms of existence’ (McTaggart 2002, p. 6).

To the greatest extent possible, the uncensored voices of Iraqis
take the foreground in Voices. In itself, this reflects the
spirit of FOE while bringing the research directly into a human
30

context, thereby avoiding the biases, and vilification of the
Middle East that is so often found in the Western press. In
taking this approach, I hoped to counter such negative
impressions and expose the current trend of the incumbent Iraqi
government that works to oppress Iraqi voices and so rendering
PAR as an impossibility. Bringing truth to the fore, and sharing
the voices of all people, is a central task for all journalists;
in many cases (Iraq being one), this means focusing on voices
rarely heard in mainstream media – the voices of everyday
citizens. This is itself a bias and a partiality, albeit one
that most journalists are keen to defend, sometimes at
immeasurable personal cost.

Other theoretical influences

In addition to the guiding influence of PAR, this project was
strengthened by the inclusion of other researchers, including
Habermas, McTaggert, van Dijk. Contemporary theorists in
discourse analysis such as Jurgen Habermas (1984), Teun van Dijk
(1995, 2008), and Robert McTaggart (1997, 2002, and Kemmis &
McTaggart 2007) ‘unpack’ or deconstruct the power relationships
inherent in language and power structures. Van Dijk is a leading
exponent of what is now recognized as the school of CDA while
Habermas is a public sphere and communicative action theorist.
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CDA emerged in the 1990s in an effort to differentiate CDA from
other forms of Discourse Analysis (DA); as theory designed to
produce and convey ‘enlightenment’ and ‘emancipation’ (Wodak and
Meyer 2008), thus aligning to the underlining principles of PAR.
Although, Habermas belongs to the ‘Critical Theorists’ that
emerged from the Frankfurt School, his work is based on the
premise that ‘social theory should be orientated towards
critiquing and changing society as a whole (Wodak and Meyer
2008, p.6)’ rather than simply looking to explain it. (Both
theorists see language as social practice to be analyzed within
the context of how it comes into being and what internal and
external factors have framed it.

The content that forms this Exegesis exists as a macro-topic, a
meso-analysis.

The subject of the disintegration of FOE as it

stood in 2011 in Iraq, was affected by a breadth of sociopolitical factors that are so vast, inter-related, layered –
that it is impossible to give the audience a definitive
explanation or solution.

Instead, I can only present ‘fact’ and

‘discourse’ as it was recorded in real time and lay it out in
exhibition and exegesis format as a set of anastomotic realities
or events.

What can be seen as a presentation of excursive

‘discourse’ described as the ‘social discourse’ of the time must
be presented in a way that shows that the events of 2011 are
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shaped by, and in turn shape ‘situation(s), institution(s) and
social structure(s) (Wodak and Meyer 2008, p.5)’. Similarly to
the premises outlined in PAR, CDA recognizes that, ‘discourse is
socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social
identities of and relationships between people and groups of
people (Wodak and Meyer 2008, p.6)’.

In fact, one of the

characteristic principles of CDA – something that I have tried
to reflect in the way content is treated in the multi-media
exhibition - is that the use of language is seen as ‘social
practice’, which is ‘determined by social structure and
contributes to stabilizing and changing that structure
simultaneously (Woday and Meyer 2008, p.7)’. In essence, both
schools of thought, CDA and PAR, together strive to negotiate a
necessary, objective space for dialogue between the power-less
and power-full, researched and researcher, at the level of the
individual, institution and larger ideology.

As I have attempted, and as in PAR, which regards transparency
as a fundamental tenet in research practice with regards to the
position of the author in relation his or her subject, CDA
researchers also make concerted attempts to ‘make their own
positions and interests explicit while retaining their
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respective scientific methodologies and while remaining selfreflective of their own research process’ (Wodak and Meyer 2008,
p.3).

These theorists provide a theoretical framework for this

Exegesis and their work informs both an active research approach
and the structure of the accompanying exhibition. The politics
of representation is best served, where PAR was rendered
inadequate in an oppressive and violent Iraq, by CDA and news
media analysis which underline discussions focused on ‘the
relationship between information, power, and democracy in Iraq’.

CDA complements PAR by offering the underlying assertion that
power relationships are evident in all forms of linguistic
communication. This was one of the central challenges of the
current research, and the very challenge that I turned to PAR to
help overcome. By leaving the rights of expression (what to say,
how and when to say it, and where to communicate it) squarely in
the hands of the Iraqis and including their emails, blogs, and
so on without editing or filtering them, I endeavored to reflect
the PAR approach as accurately as possible without making life
any more dangerous than it already was for outspoken Iraqi
citizens.

I chose this approach because it seemed to be the one most
likely to result in an unbiased, democratic representation or
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transfer of information from the domain of factual discourse to
its presentation in an exhibition format. An unbiased,
democratic presentation of discourse is important not only to
counter the audience's preconceptions of Iraq and Iraqis as
presented in Western media, but also to observe the researcher’s
own limitations, as noted earlier.

Despite my efforts to present the data in an impartial manner,
it was impossible to extricate myself completely from this
highly politicized work without some form of personal bias in
defense of those who were the subject of my study. Fisk and
Hass, both having focused their work on the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict, explain in greater detail the nuanced and complex sets
of ethical challenges that arise when empathizing with a
subject, and that, at times, history bids us to throw down our
‘impartial observer’ hat, and take a stand. When internal power
structures and totalitarian states mute citizens’ voices, when
foreign agendas bid us to view conflict or post-conflict
scenarios in a certain light, and paint a state and its people
as ‘rogue’ and ‘evil’, we are obligated to take an editorial
slant and defend the human rights of those excluded by the
politics of power. This, of course, does not replace more
clinical reporting on who, what, when, where, and why, but
coexists alongside such journalism.
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The notion of blanket stereotypes used by the press with regard
to the Middle East would shock few informed readers. In his
book, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle
East, author Robert Fisk addressed the often polemic and
controversial roles of media (and journalists) charged with
reflecting reality while simultaneously affecting change. Fisk
(2007, pp. 21-22) wrote:

I suppose, in the end, we journalists try — or should try —
to be the first impartial witness to history. If we have
any reason for our existence, the least must be our
impartial ability to report history as it happens so that
no one can say, “We didn’t know — no one told us”.

… I think that this [from Israeli journalist Amira Hass] is
the best definition of journalism that I have heard: to
challenge authority — all authority — especially when
government and politicians take us to war, when they have
decided to kill, and others will die.

Both discourse analysis and the attenuated PAR were helpful as a
framework for attaining these journalistic and egalitarian goals
in compiling this Exegesis.

PAR assists Western researchers to
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mitigate the West’s tendency to ‘Orientalize’ or objectify Iraq,
Iraqis and Iraqi culture. Discourse analysis similarly works to
unpick texts and expose agendas in journalism and foreign
policy.

Edward Said’s research also informs this project. In Said’s 1978
book, Orientalism, he redefined notions of Orientalism, and
exposed what he saw as postcolonial rhetoric and false
assumptions made by the West particularly regarding the Middle
East. In the preface to the 2003 edition, Said reframes the
original text in light of the continued generation of
‘Orientalist’ rhetoric and attitudes, showing how they have been
manifested in Western foreign relations policy. He exposes the
vilification of the ‘other’, as fomented by the Western war
machine in justifying the occupation of Afghanistan (in 2001)
and Iraq (in 2003). Said (2003, p. 13) explains:

These supreme fictions lend themselves easily to
manipulation and the organization of collective passion has
never been more evident than in our time, when the
mobilizations of fear, hatred, disgust and resurgent selfpride and arrogance — much of it having to do with Islam
and Arabs on one side, “we” Westerners on the other — are
very large-scale enterprises.
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A central idea of Orientalism is that Western knowledge about
the East is not generated from facts or reality, but from
preconceived archetypes that envision all ‘Eastern’ societies as
fundamentally similar to one another, and fundamentally
dissimilar to ‘Western’ societies. This discourse establishes
‘the East’ as antithetical to ‘the West’ and so enables a set of
discourses that are given legitimacy to colonize and rule.

Said (2003, p. 23) further notes that countering false rubrics
about the other, be it ‘the West’ or ‘the East’, requires a
‘humanism’ based on human individuality and agency, and an
avoidance of defining others based on ‘received ideas’ passed
down from approved authorities.

Consequently, journalistic and

foreign policy discourse on Iraq would constantly silence Iraqis
and instead give credence and legitimacy to Western business and
influence.

Humanism-as-action fits within the PAR framework, which is
action oriented, community minded, and focused on seeking and
accepting diverse viewpoints. Within his framework of humanism,
Said concludes that to counter notions of otherness, texts
produced must be read or understood within their historical and
cultural contexts. He sees humanism as the ‘final resistance we
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have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure
human history’ (2003, p. 23), and is encouraged by the
democratizing potential of cyberspace in leveling the playing
field and allowing diverse voices to be heard. In Said’s words
(2003, pp. 23-24):

[T]he world-wide protests before the war began in Iraq
would not have been possible were it not for the existence
of alternative communities across the globe, informed by
alternative news sources and keenly aware of the
environmental, human rights, and libertarian impulses that
bind us together in this tiny planet.

Inspired by Said’s work, Voices attempts to deconstruct or
illuminate this same complex, multi-layered issue. Voices was
created with the intention of representing the Iraqis’
discourses exclusively with their own voices, without bias or
inference of any stereotype. Indeed, the contributors to the
diary are Sunni, Shia, Christian, Turkman, Arab, and Kurd; women
and men; young and old; and all are battling for their right to
free speech. The guided artist in Voices being responsive and
selecting with consultation via telephone, email, social media –
to represent as fairly as possible the diary – being the
assembly of these discourses, on a pedestal, represented under
39

lights, in public view, honoured.

As Said predicted, new media technologies made not only this
research possible, but also the protest movements themselves, as
individual citizens shared, sent, and received information about
their government and its actions with a global audience. This
element lies at the core of this Exegesis, and it is precisely
this new media platform that fomented and communicated the Arab
Spring uprisings. The Iraqi elites are well aware of the power
of this unprecedented freedom of information. At the time of
this writing, an Information Crimes Technology draft law is
awaiting its second reading by the Iraqi Parliament. As we will
see in later chapters, the draft law is so pernicious in nature,
with provisions so ill defined, that it has the potential to
severely restrict internet usage and the flow of information for
most Iraqi citizens. Internet-related crimes are defined
arbitrarily, and yet punishments are extreme.

Like Said, Fisk argues for a more humanist and contextualized
representation of the Arab and Islamic world. He also calls for
active rather than passive reporting, hoping that journalists
might be able to shift some ideological paradigms and effect
change. Said and Fisk understand that ‘Orientalism’ persists,
through the uncritical use of problematic images and
40

representation, as the perpetuation of marginalization,
exclusion, inequality and negative views of peoples and events.
Attempting to counter such stereotypes and producing counterimages and counter-representations can therefore be a highly
subversive act. It is in this same spirit that I hope to
transfer the reality of Iraq in 2011 to a Western audience,
perhaps shifting in some small way its preconceived ideas about
Iraq and Arab people overall. It is for this reason that Voices
was constructed with the aim of removing this ‘Western’ artist,
writer from the story as much as possible so as to let Iraqis
speak directly as possible to members of the Western audience.

Rationale for removing the author from the audio-visual
testimony

Although many of the uprisings in Iraq in 2011 took place in
Baghdad, in Tahrir Square (Freedom Square), and some – as in the
Day of Rage on February 25 – were organized to storm the IZ
(where I lived and worked), I did not have physical access to
all the uprisings nationwide. Nevertheless, I was in constant
communication with journalists, bloggers, activists, and human
rights watch groups, mostly through e-mail, Facebook, and
YouTube uploads. Using social media, I participated in and
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reacted as fully as possible to these intense and lively
conversations. I witnessed the action from the other side of the
T-walls of the IZ as events were relayed to me across various
media. While far from ideal, this very real logistical
limitation with high rate of delivery broadband and unrestricted
access also exemplifies how new media platforms can transmit
information effectively and instantaneously across physical
barriers such as those in my physically removed and militarily
secured compound.

The photographic and video work of Voices provides the
audiovisual context within which the research was conducted.
Voices acts as the canvas on which participants’ expressions
come to life. In a sense, my photographs and video are
meaningless: they are not artistic and they do not tell a story,
apart from my physical isolation from the action. Instead, they
serve as a backdrop. They are structural. They are images of
concrete walls, sandbags and Hesco barriers. The diary excerpts
and the YouTube 3G phone postings are the voices, the graffiti
that appears indiscriminately, randomly, urgently under a need
to express. It is these voices, and these images, that will help
counter the persistent Orientalism that is maintained through
the repetitive distribution of problematic images and other
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misrepresentations of Iraqis by those who would work against
their best interests.

Roland Barthes (1977) is credited with the notion that the
author, as artist in the post-modern age of mechanical
reproduction, is dead. In the modern age, the reader — and in
this exhibition, the audience — has become the author. To quote
Barthes (1977, p. 148):

We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer
by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good
society in favour of the very thing it sets aside, ignores,
smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing its
future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of
the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author.

As the exhibition’s creator, I see myself as a conduit of
information, collecting it and transmitting it to a public. The
collection, organization, and presentation of materials take
precedence over the photographic work. The somber vista of
photography and video serves as a neutral canvas that gives life
to the ‘noise’, and to the compelling debate and conversation in
contemporary Iraq. The photographs or video are merely
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architectural depictions of the physical environment that serves
as backdrop and context.

The photographic content of this work draws primarily on
documentary photography, but with the additional ‘text’ added
(the exhibition as a whole), aligns itself most closely with
visual sociology. The photographic element within the exhibition
aligns as closely as possible to pure documentation, in which
the author’s voice is minimized and objectivity or impartiality
is maximized; it is a didactic representation of physical
reality. Traditionally, documentary photography was tied to
exploration and social reform. Although the boundaries of
documentary photography and visual sociology can be unclear,
documentary photography is more scientific in its approach and
prioritizes the recording of what is before the lens for the
purposes of social documentation and change, whereas visual
sociology focuses on relating a narrative.

In Voices, the photographs are documentary photography pure;
they are life-sized shots of blast walls.

They are pure

manifestations, if not black and white reproductions of the
physical surroundings. Only when juxtaposed with the text
excerpts and the overall information and themes presented do
they act as metaphors for the challenges faced by Iraq’s
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citizens clamoring to have their voices heard. The photographic
depictions of the blast walls not only record and recreate the
physical constraints; in a subversive way, they also show just
how insurmountable the demand for free flows of information is
for civilian Iraqis.

Photographic research — the act of taking photographs in a
photo-documentarian context — is the enactment of emerging with
some understanding. Like all cultural objects, photographs get
their meaning from their context. Photographs as discourse, and
how they are presented, can define and create labels and
categories by drawing boundaries around people and their
behaviors. Photographs convey meanings that are culturally
specific to the society in which they exist.

Through the inclusion of public discourse in the form of ‘text’
(which, in semiotic theory, pertains to words, sound, and
image), Voices endeavors to give a say to the Iraqi people in
promulgating their lived challenges to freedom of expression and
the physical and psychological repercussions of this struggle on
their lives.

Voices aims to remove the denotative meanings inherent in the
capturing of information (a photograph, for example), and the
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connotative meanings implied in the transfer of information to
the reader or audience. To achieve this, the information (text)
is presented in a manner reflective of museum exhibits, where
material is presented as sourced historical artifacts in a very
strict time-line, based on the researcher’s 2011 diary. Thus the
schedule, not the author (researcher), dictates which voices
speak, thus largely and in so doing, attempting to liberate the
work from the author’s own biases or attachments to certain
parts of the subject matter or certain participants. In this
way, the audience’s experience with the text is more direct and
the audience and the subjects are more intimately connected
through the use of unedited original communications.

Presentation of the multi-media exhibition, Voices

The dialogue and data used in Voices, is juxtaposed against a
neutral architectural canvas of photographs, with the aim of
bringing the voice of Iraqis to the fore. Thus the photographic
component adheres to the principles of documentary photography
and, with the addition of Iraqi voices, aims towards visual
sociology. It strives to maximize impartiality while minimizing
the artist’s (my) voice within the exhibition.
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The aim of the exhibition is to present ‘text’ from various
media in such a way that the audience perceives the information
as randomly as possible, without the background photographs
holding any inherent meaning. Taken together, the photographs,
text, and other data should not create inferred meaning: rather,
the ensemble should create arbitrary ‘noise’ within a space,
that serves to break down any stereotypes of Iraq and its
culture that may exist in the audience’s mind. Although I am
keenly aware that I cannot uniformly moderate the resulting or
produced meaning to any degree, my goal is to offer a novel
multimedia experience.

Accordingly, the exhibition does not feature my photographs as
central either to the research or to the assignment of meaning.
It is not my goal to use Iraq as a case study of oppression and
social injustice, but rather to promote what I consider the more
compelling story — the Iraqi experience itself, as lived and
expressed by Iraqi citizens and journalists. This is achieved by
reinterpreting or ‘recolonizing’ the facts and presenting them
to an audience that would not normally be privy to such a
perspective on the knowledge. The exhibition provides an
uncensored platform for local Iraqi voices, demonstrating their
variety, frequency, and intelligence. It also makes clear the
highly politicized discourse of the actors/participants, which
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exists against a backdrop of oppression born of war, the
political repercussions of U.S. hegemony, post-war Iraq, and the
immense suffering of the Iraqi people that is the result not
only of the 2003 occupation by the Western alliance but also by
the portrayal and recolonisation of Iraq in Western media.

The exhibition, as an adjunct to this Exegesis, requires a
reflective appraisal of recently exhumed documentation with a
view toward reframing the story through a contemporary ‘museumstyle’ a curatorial aesthetic. I have been vigilant in editing
and presenting the magnitude of information available to me in a
way that endeavours to maintain impartiality, striving to show
every aspect of this multifarious issue. Simultaneously, I have
been creating a space for an Australian audience so they might
negotiate the complexity of the material without becoming
overwhelmed.

For more than two years as UN employee, I lived with the
challenges facing the Iraqi media and citizens in respect to
freedom of expression and freedom of information. My ultimate
hope for Voices is that the contributions of these individuals
will allow us to reveal the undercurrents, the macro and the
micro forces at play on the political and social stages, which
serve as the backdrop to this fractious, complex and polarized
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issue and the persistent short- and long-term insecurity that
plagues journalists in Iraq.
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Chapter 2
The relationship between information, power,
and democracy in Iraq

Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and
the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be
neutral.

Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging
in the process of inquiry is one of violence … to alienate
humans from their own decision making is to change them into
objects.

— Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed

Iraq in the indices

According to Reporters Without Borders 2011–2012 World Press
Freedom Index, Iraq was listed in 152nd position out of 179
countries (Reporters Without Borders 2012). In the Centre for
Law and Democracy’s Global Right to Information Rating (CLD
2011b), Iraq does not even appear, as it currently has no
legislated right to information act.
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Although no index is completely bias-free, and most tend toward
Western conceptualizations of freedom and democracy, such
strikingly low scores are cause enough to warrant concern — and
demands a closer analysis — regardless of indices’ bias.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ 2012),
151 Iraqi journalists have been killed since 1992. Of the 94
that were murdered, 93 were murdered with impunity.

In his study on mass communication and its relationship to
power, van Dijk (1995, p. 10) comments that:

In order to understand the role of the news media and their
messages, one needs to pay detailed attention to the
structures and strategies of such discourses and to the
ways these relate to institutional arrangements, on the one
hand, and to the audience, on the other.

By ‘institutional arrangements’, van Dijk refers to the news
financiers, the politicians, the professionals — in short, the
elite powerbrokers. According to van Dijk, we need to
acknowledge both the powerbrokers’ and the media’s capacity to
influence or even intentionally manipulate audiences, and define
the precise conditions in which this occurs. If the media’s
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independence is controlled or restricted, the media cannot
engage impartially in public or political discourse, and
citizens remain uninformed and unable to participate
meaningfully in the political process. At times, of course, this
situation works to the direct benefit of the powerbrokers: as
the case with the construction of the myth of weapons of mass
destruction which lead to the unjustified invasion of Iraq by
the UK and USA in 2003.

Audiences and media consumers are generally thought of as being
influenced by information, but retaining their own opinions and
reaching their own conclusions (van Dijk 1995). Control of
information or knowledge influences understanding. In Iraq as
elsewhere, we should ask: Who are the powerbrokers in these
knowledge transactions? Is it the economic elite, the executive
authority? Is it the media? Are the media truly independent? Do
they serve the interests of political factions? Are they
restricted by the reality of economic and political instability
— and, if so, how? And, at what level are the institutions that
safeguard principles of freedom of expression and the free flow
of information independent?

These questions lead to others: At what point in newly emerging
democratic states does the news media serve to destabilize the
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process, and at what point does it serve to reinforce stability,
peace and democracy? What mechanisms need to be in place in
order to rebuild professionalism in journalism and eliminate the
culture of suspicion? Suspicion and the potential for
retribution are usually rampant in newly formed democracies, as
they emerge from totalitarian regimes, where public information
was heavily censored and controlled. This Exegesis includes some
recommendations that are accepted in international contexts such
as the United Nations, yet such recommendations are difficult to
implement in post-conflict countries – Iraq being just one
example.

Habermas (2006) asserts that news media exerts power because it
selects, processes, and shapes political discourse and then
releases it into the public domain, where it influences
citizens. In an environment that supports democratic principles
such as free speech, the media can elect to convey information
impartially, offering a variety of opinions and perspectives
without a prescribed political agenda dominating public
discourse. Habermas (2006, p. 419) describes this scenario as
follows:

From the viewpoint of democratic legitimacy, media power
nevertheless remains “innocent” to the extent that
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journalists operate within a functionally specific and selfregulating media system. The relative independence of mass
media from the political and the economic systems was a
necessary precondition for the rise of what is now called
“media society”.

For such ‘media societies’ to function independently, they need
the corresponding enabling legislative environment.

Definition of an ‘enabling environment’

Media and democracy need each other and prosper only when they
develop together. Media professionalism alone will do little to
secure — and can do much to destabilize — a fragile new
democracy. As Gillette (2006, p. 1) clearly stated:

In order to exercise generally accepted standards of
professional, independent journalism, media needs at least
a minimally secure legal and political environment in which
to operate — what is now commonly termed in the media
development arena as an “enabling environment”.

Freedom of the press, and the enabling environment it requires,
has a direct relationship on a healthy and functioning
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democracy. Likewise, a free press has a positive influence on
governance; the development and establishment of stable, rulebased institutional environments; and on economic and social
progress (UNESCO 2008). The World Bank has found that there is
frequently (although certainly not always — consider China, for
example, or even Australia, considered as one of the world’s
most liberal democracies has a media that lies diminished and
constrained) a correlation between countries where war is not a
primary objective and the presence of a relatively free press.

The World Bank’s voice and accountability indicator is
particularly pertinent to press freedom. This indicator envelops
areas such as ‘perceptions of government accountability, the
credibility of political institutions, and civil and political
rights, and also measures the ability of citizens to participate
in the selection and renewal of governments’ (UNESCO 2008, p.
78). Regrettably, with the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the
entire civil service, police, and military were dismantled and
the interim government made almost no effort to preserve Iraq’s
infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals, and power plants),
making human rights advocates’ work more difficult, and stalling
the development of independent media in Iraq.
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Another vital factor related to transparent governance is the
relationship between transparent elections, governance, and
media, and this will be discussed later in this Exegesis.

The impact of independent media in conflict and post-conflict
environments

Before, during, and after a conflict, the news media have
enormous potential for impact, which can be positive or
negative. Media can be used to foment hatred (as in Rwanda in
1994 and the Balkans during the conflicts in the 1990s), or to
provide the impartial news and information a democracy needs in
order to function (James 2004). Ronald Koven (cited in James
2004, p. 15) of the World Press Freedom Committee warns against
burdening the media with responsibilities above and beyond the
primary task of informing:

Freedom of the press means freedom for the media to set
their own agenda. They best perform their task when they
are left at liberty to air the debates, tensions and
contradictions in society.

Most journalists around the world agree that the profession’s
primary aim is to strive for the impartial provision of
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information. A journalist should not appear to identify with one
side over another, or with any individuals or groups, since
doing so carries the risk of undermining the journalist’s
professional integrity. In conflict and post-conflict
situations, bias and partiality may threaten the physical safety
of the individual or groups in question. Andrew Pudephat (cited
in James 2004, p. 24) echoed this sentiment when describing the
role of a journalist as neutral, with a duty to explain with
balance and fairness. Alongside the argument that in conflict
and post-conflict situations a journalist’s mission should be to
promote peace, one can also argue that local news media have a
critical impact — either positive or negative — on the process
of reconciliation and long-term conflict management. Take as
example Editor, Edison Yongai, who ran the Seiera Leone ‘The
Point’ under a brutal regime and equally violent liberation
army.

It is essential that news media be independent — but what does
an independent media look like in post-conflict situations, and
how does this play out in Iraq? Journalists — whether they are
working in a peaceful and stable environment, or during or after
a conflict — want to report independently, fairly, and with
impartiality. The issue for news media working in conflict and
post-conflict environments is that the enabling environment that
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allows for independent journalism to thrive is threatened or
nonexistent.

Challenges to freedom of expression and information in
contemporary Iraq

In working to support FOE in contemporary Iraq, we must look to
international conventions and treaties, analyses and reports
that define concepts, set standards and protect ‘ideals’ of
human rights and their application. However, even human rights
ideals set forth in the Iraqi Constitution or in international
treaties signed by Iraq must be viewed in light of the unique
sociopolitical context within Iraq today. Because of the lack of
scholarly research on the evolving landscape of contemporary
Iraqi journalism, the following discussion will rely on firsthand experience working in Iraq and with the media community to
evaluate and define how the patterns within Iraq’s media scene
and its context are working towards or against generally
accepted international standards and practices.

The sociopolitical context for media and media-related
legislation in Iraq is fraught with challenges. These include
but are not limited to Iraq’s legacy of authoritarian rule, lack
of impartial media outlets, lack of professional capacity,
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retaliation against journalists, lack of an effective civil
service infrastructure, lack of a ‘media society’, and a
pervasive culture of suspicion.

A legacy of authoritarian rule
The most fundamental challenge to FOE/FOI in Iraq is the
threatening nature of information, even in contemporary Iraq.
Although Saddam Hussein no longer holds power, vestiges of his
authoritarian regime remain apparent; removal of the
dictatorship has not ended Iraq’s totalitarian practices, as
this report and others, such as the report published by
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Barometer (2013),
illuminate.

The Freedom Barometer report states that the threat

faced by Iraq’s journalists (including media workers and social
media producers who produce significant amounts of public
interest journalism) ‘comes above all from the authorities or
political figures that block them from gaining access to certain
areas. Abusive measures and legal proceedings against newspapers
for “defamation” have become commonplace’ (Reporters Without
Borders 2013).

Working from the premise that information equals power, the
accessibility of information can have a deep impact on the
ability of a country's constituency to make informed decisions
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and actively participate in the decision-making process. Thus,
as in Iraq, it is logical for those in power (and those who want
to maintain power) to fear both FOE and FOI. This has been true
throughout human history.

Christopher Dickey (2011-2012, p. 13) details just how
threatening access to information can be to the existence of
authoritarian regimes, pointing out the measures Saddam Hussein
took to restrict the free circulation of information in Iraq:

[T]he Gutenberg revolution that transformed Europe in the
15th Century did not arrive in the Ottoman Empire until
more than three centuries later … [and until] more
recently, Saddam Hussein banned the private ownership of
typewriters in Iraq, and kept copying machines under lock
and key as if they were weapons of mass destruction.

Although FOE is a recognized right under Article 38 of Iraq's
constitution and the country is a signatory to several
international conventions outlining the exercise of human
rights, in recent years the incumbent government has moved
steadily towards the restriction of FOE, FOI, and civil
liberties. The space for FOE is shrinking. In Iraq, it seems,
law is not enough.
60

Lack of impartial media outlets
In understanding the challenges facing media and discourse in
contemporary Iraq, we must also consider the capacity of Iraq's
professional media to be impartial. To quote a senior colleague
(who wished to remain anonymous) working on FOE in Iraq, ‘Iraq's
media is thriving — not independent’. There is little
advertising revenue in Iraq; most media outlets are privately
funded and some have become mouthpieces of ethno-political
factions with the potential to incite violence, increase
sectarian divisions and fan the flames of civil war. This
occurred not only in Iraq, but the Balkans, Rwanda and this list
goes on; countries in which despotic governments have muzzled
the free flow in information that any healthy democracy should
share.

In post-conflict Iraq, as in post-war Yugoslavia, the media are
dominated by ethno-sectarian and political factions. In Iraq
prior to 2003, all information was state controlled through five
state-owned daily newspapers and one government channel
disseminating state propaganda. After the fall of the Hussein
regime in 2003, media outlets sprang up virtually overnight to
broadcast the voice and opinion of the Kurdish, Turkman, Arab
Sunni and Arab Shiite factions, both nationally and to audiences
abroad. This expansion had an undeniable impact on the
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development of a healthy and diverse media environment in Iraq –
an impact that at first seemed to hold promise, but which
quickly turned sour.

During times of relative peace, ethno-political ownership often
reflected that peace and diversity in the press. However, as the
political situation in Iraq began to disintegrate between 2005
and 2008, media polarization undermined the weakened state’s
capacity to govern, and so opened the door for political parties
to reinforce Iraq’s sectarian divisions (Albany Associates
2009). Albany Associates (p. 6) notes that, ‘independent media
with no ethno-sectarian affiliation do exist, but they lack the
access to funds or physical protection, as they would have under
the protection of a political party’.

Lack of professional capacity
Beyond the challenges posed by repressive legislation pertaining
to FOE and FOI, Iraqi media also suffer from an unintentional
lack of professional capacity. Although the international
community has placed significant emphasis on training Iraqi
media professionals since 2003, Iraq still lacks an updated
university journalism curriculum; the curriculum used by media
departments in higher education was written in the 1960s.
Although UNESCO has recently revised the journalism curriculum
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in Iraq, it has yet to be adopted by universities. In addition,
of course, many practicing journalists today have come to the
profession with insufficient training, and many move from one
media outlet to another in search of a better job. The net
result is that both veterans and newcomers remain poorly
informed of, and ill equipped to follow, international best
practices in journalism.

Retaliation against journalists
In spite of these challenges, the current media scene in Iraq is
surprisingly pluralistic and lively. Journalists are
increasingly outspoken in their criticism of social and
political issues, and corruption among government institutions
and officials. However, the majority of media outlets are owned
by sectarian organizations, which can make it difficult for
journalists to gain access to information from other
organizations, or to report on those groups in an unbiased
manner. Indeed, Albany Associates (2009, p. 7) notes that
journalists who have been too outwardly critical have ‘often
been subjected to blackmail, detention, [or] death itself’.

Currently, media professionals in Iraq are held in the grip of
legislation that restricts their freedom to practice their
profession with the independence their colleagues enjoy in many
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other countries. The independent institutions or media oversight
bodies that safeguard these basic freedoms have also come under
threat of government control: these include the Communications
and Media Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the High
Electoral Commission and every level of the judicial system.
Reports asserting that the Iraqi government is seeking to
restrict freedoms and increase its control over all aspects of
civil and political life by controlling access to information
are increasingly common.

The International Crisis Group (ICG 2011, p. 2) observes:

The 2005 constitution and the existing legal framework
require a number of institutions — the Board of Supreme
Audit, the Integrity Commission, the Inspectors General,
parliament and the courts — to monitor government
operations. Yet, none of these institutions has been able
to assert itself in the face of government interference,
intransigence and manipulation, a deficient legal
framework, and ongoing threats of violence.

The same report (ICG 2011, p. 2) goes on to state that:
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These factors have caused senior officials to resign,
including most notably the head of the Integrity Commission
on 9 September 2011. Even civil society organisations —
confronted by government intimidation in the form of
anonymous threats, arrests of political activists, and
violence, including police brutality — have proved
incapable of placing a check on government. Although the
perpetrators have yet to be found, the killing on 9
September 2011 of a prominent journalist and leading
organiser of weekly protests against government corruption
has contributed to rising fears of the Maliki government’s
authoritarian streak.

Lack of an effective civil service infrastructure
An additional challenge is Iraq’s lack of a functioning civil
service infrastructure. Without the infrastructure for effective
judiciary, executive and legislative advocacy for human rights
protection and FOE — coupled with the necessary skilled
personnel on the ground to carry out such work — the development
of a free and independent media can only exist in a vacuum.

Lack of a ‘media society’
Iraq has yet to create a ‘media society’ as defined by Habermas.
There are a number of challenges to this process, legislation
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being key among them. In Iraq today, media-related legislation
is still being drafted, and so gives political authority the
power to shape how media will operate. Although the government
cannot directly influence content, it can influence the way
media operates by defining operational parameters through
legislation.

Other factors also hinder the development of a media society.
For instance, insufficient advertising revenue limits the
media’s ability to operate independently – another result of
most media outlets in Iraq being privately bankrolled by various
political factions. Besides offering greater economic stability,
being ‘in the pocket’ of a given political faction provides
journalists working in a fractious and violent environment with
a degree of protection and security (Albany Associates 2009).

A pervasive culture of suspicion
A culture of suspicion and the potential for retribution prevail
in Iraq, oscillating between constitutional authorities
(executive, judicial and legislative) and the professional news
media. This is endemic in many Arab countries, where heavyhanded state control is the norm, both historically (in Iraq,
for example, under Saddam Hussein) and in the present day. In
today’s Iraq, the public generally views the judiciary as
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politicized or corrupt — less so, perhaps, than other
governmental institutions, but politicized or corrupt,
nonetheless.

A lack of access to the courts and a lack of a transparent
system of justice only exacerbates the public’s feelings of
distrust. Although Iraq’s constitution provides for open court
proceedings, in reality, the courts are relatively inaccessible.
Aside from a generally poor image of the courts and the courts’
inaccessibility, which is undermining the development of
democratic institutions, the lack of accurate information about
the courts has a chilling effect on the citizens’ confidence in
asserting their individual rights, paradoxically this includes
the rights of media professionals and the fight against
impunity. Other institutions of government may not have the best
interests of the public at heart, but if there is no justice to
be found in the courts, the resultant feeling is: why bother
fighting?

This culture of suspicion perpetuates itself through a cycle of
non-communication that flies in the face of open justice.
According to one expert (who requested anonymity) with decades
of experience in media development in post-conflict settings,
there is a feeling among the powerbrokers that the media doesn’t
67

know what they are talking about, so there is no point in
talking to them. Of course, in most open justice systems, the
news media is the channel through which information flows. The
closed-minded attitude toward media among powerbrokers in Iraq
is apparent in the relationship between most arms of executive
or state power and the local media.

Providing media with access to public officials and political
representation is one way in which powerbrokers can manage
information, while maintaining some semblance of an open justice
system. Habermas (2006, p. 419) notes that governments often
take a strong stance regarding socially negotiated access to the
media, but asserts that:

[G]overnments usually have no control over how the media
then present and interpret their messages, over how
political elites or wider publics receive them, or over how
they respond to them.

It is worth noting that Habermas was commenting on Western
models in which FOE and FOI are widely accepted.

In response to such criticism, the Iraqi Parliament is currently
(in 2012) reviewing a draft of the Law of the National Media
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Center (NMI draft law), which at first glance appears to
establish a press room within the Council of Representatives
(COR). This is standard procedure in most countries. However,
the draft law seeks to manage the media’s access to the COR
through an authorization process managed by the prime minister’s
office. Even more problematic, the draft law would curb access
to information further, by restricting direct access to
parliamentary proceedings and instead supplying journalists with
recordings of hearings via a dedicated broadcast channel. This
draft law is one of a raft of media laws currently in front of
Parliament (see Chapter 5).

The right regulations and legal framework need to be in place to
support a free press, and the economy needs to be strong enough
to support a financially sustainable media that is economically
independent from any existing powerbrokers with biased, selfserving political agendas. In Iraq, the media is no longer a
passive instrument of state control as it was under the former
regime. Today, it is very active and certainly pluralistic, yet
its independence remains tenuous at best. In his book, The New
Arab Journalist (2011, p. 227), Lawrence Pintak describes the
views of Arab journalists in the post-Saddam Hussein era as
follows:
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Arab journalists had made clear how important the issue of
professionalism was; it was the common denominator to which
both Arab and Western journalists aspired, even if the Arab
view of the mission of journalism – to create political and
social change – diverged from that of many Western
journalists.
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Chapter 3
An exploration of the establishment of free media
in a post-conflict society

In this chapter, my aim is to draw a comparison between the
principles used by the international community in another
setting and those that might be used to help establish a free
media in contemporary Iraq. In the future, this comparative
discussion will be enhanced by the publication of additional
scholarly research on the topic, but research undertaken by
Franque (2009), Gillette (2006), Haselock (2010), James (2004),
and Richhiardi (2011) provides an excellent starting point.

The direct relationship between news media regulation and
media’s effect on emerging democracies in post-conflict
environments cannot be ignored. Financial and professional
independence of the media, targeted consultative approaches
engendering local ownership in decision-making processes, and
the application of development structures are all crucial if
media is to form the basis of a healthy and functioning
democracy (Haselock 2010). In this chapter, we will take a
closer look at the role media played in post-conflict Bosnia and
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Kosovo, in an exploration of a situation that was, in some ways,
parallel to the media environment in Iraq today.

Of course, prior to entering the analysis of news media in postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, we should add the requisite
disclaimer: Despite the similar challenges that independent
media face in post-conflict scenarios, Iraq is not Kosovo. While
there are many regulatory and legislative similarities, it is
critical to recognize the unique cultural, political, social,
economic and historical conditions that exist in any setting and
that produce different ways of handling conflict and postconflict situations in the news media. Nevertheless, a
discussion of the similarities is natural and warranted, as it
might prove useful in understanding the situation in Iraq today.
It is also worth exploring whether the international
interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo succeeded in bringing about
the development of a truly independent media sector.

International strategies and response

After the disintegration of the Yugoslavian State, the
International Interventions and strategies that were implemented
in the Balkans did not work and continue to invite criticism.
Similar to Iraq, there arose a sudden unfettered media boom.
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These new media houses were quick to suffer from factionalized
programming as one of the only means to keep media centers
running on a financial level was through political backing. From
the perspective of safety, employees could also enjoy the
relative security that was offered by the in-house security or
militia groups. Robert Gillette - who tried in 2003 Iraq to work
with the Pentagon and Paul Bremmer of the CPA – was blocked in
his efforts to right the wrongs from the Kosovo experience and
to introduce a new methodology for Iraqis in media development.
Gillette was the media commissioner of Kosovo from 2003 to 2006.
He recounts his experiences in a speech to the European
Evaluation Society (EES) in 2004 (Gillette 2006), stating:

In Central Europe and the Baltic states, where the rule of
law quickly took root in the 1990s, early media assistance
helped jump-start professionalism and provided useful
business skills that paved the way until private investment
could take over. American media aid to post-communist
Europe began during the Reagan presidency as a response to
the dramatic flowering of new radio and television stations
and newspapers that began with the collapse of communism in
1989 and accelerated with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Hundreds of new media outlets appeared
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almost overnight, initially in the region stretching from
Estonia to Bulgaria, and later from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan.

Many of these media outlets were owned by sectarian groups and
used to launder money or incite violence and ethnic hatred, all
of which undermined the peace-building process (Gillette 2006).
In general, the West’s goal in post-Communist cultures was to
support the transition from authoritarian rule to market-driven
liberal democracies, using three implementation strategies for
news media development: pluralization, regulation, and
professionalism (Franque 2009). These strategies have also been
used in Iraq.

In supporting post-authoritarian states in the move towards
democracy, the international community has worked to build the
capacity of the free press by investing in news media
development. Press Now, the Amsterdam-based NGO, defined media
development as, ‘activity undertaken to help media outlets work
according to the professional and ethical standards which are
today expected in, and of, democratic societies’, going on to
say, ‘media development can include a range of actions directed
at media organizations themselves, or at their political,
economic, legal, and regulatory contexts’ (Franque 2009, p. 94).
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In Bosnia and Kosovo, international donors and overseers were
slow to grasp that even the most professional and politically
independent media that already existed would not survive long
without an enabling environment to support it, much like Iraq.
It took two years and two elections after the Dayton Agreement
to grant the so-called ‘Bonn Powers’ in 1997; when these powers
were granted, the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
finally held the power to implement the Dayton Agreement with
decreased obstruction or interference from local nationalist
politicians or factions. With this power, the OHR was able to
support the international community’s efforts to ensure that
globally recognized principles of democracy be built into postwar reconstruction efforts. At the same time, it was able to
assert a systematic, positive influence on the process of
creating the environment required for independent media to
operate, by way of media-development interventions.

As Gillette has stated (2006, p. 1):

Creating an enabling environment involves establishing an
interlocking set of laws, as well as regulatory and
educational institutions aimed at protecting journalists;
to license and otherwise regulate broadcasting according to
democratic principles; and to protect the public from the
75

worst kinds of journalism, usually through modern civil
libel law and, according to the European model, codes of
conduct.

The NATO military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995
represented the beginning of a new era of international
intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. Simon Haselock
(2010, p. 2), an associate of the Programme in Comparative Media
Law and Policy at Oxford University, asserts that this was, in
part,

… spurred on by the specters of similar atrocities such as
[the genocide in] Rwanda, galvanizing the international
community to act out of a “responsibility to protect”
populations from the atrocities of war, oppression, and
disaster.

As evidence of this new attitude towards intervention, Haselock
points out that powerful nations of the world have intervened
not only in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also in Sierra Leone, Chad,
Afghanistan, and Iraq and that ‘[o]f the 54 UN peacekeeping
missions since 1945, 41 began after 1988, with 15 still in play’
(Haselock 2010, p. 2). The signing of the Dayton Agreement in
1995 marked the beginning of nation-building in Bosnia — the
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largest such effort since the end of World War II. Haselock
(2010, p. 3) explains:

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) confronted the
challenge of breaking the political control of the Bosnian
media by trying to democratize it in the hope of
democratizing Bosnia and by looking at how Western liberal
media systems were constructed and regulated …

Three years after the Dayton Agreement was signed, the Madrid
Peace Implementation Council declaration of 1998 (PIC Madrid
Declaration 1998) articulated the media reform objective for
Bosnia as, ‘furthering media reform, to promote a free exchange
of ideas and opinion’. This was to be accomplished in part by
establishing a collaborative public broadcasting corporation
that respected the diverse cultural backgrounds across the
country.

Haselock (2010, p. 3) indicated that media reform in Bosnia
would have three primary objectives: ‘the removal of direct
party political control from all media’; ‘the establishment of a
legal and regulatory framework to maintain media standards
consistent with Western democratic best practices, ensure media
freedom, and raise journalistic and broadcast standards’; and
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the ‘adoption and full implementation of Western public service
standards [by] all public broadcasters’.

The OHR was ready to impose these principles by military force,
if necessary, as demonstrated in 1997 in the case of Srpska
Radio Televizija Pale, which was at the time controlled by the
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic (Haselock 2010). The
station was seen as fomenting discord and engendering opposition
to the imperatives of the Dayton Accord and NATO. Due to its
monopoly over the airwaves (no air space was provided to antiKaradzic parties), the station was also deemed a threat to the
planned ‘fair’ and ‘democratic’ elections (Haselock 2010). The
OHR swiftly persuaded NATO to take down the station’s
transmission towers and a new cross-entity public broadcasting
service, the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), was developed in its
stead (Haselock 2010). The OBN came under heavy criticism for
being top-heavy with international consultants and for failing
to seek out local consultation or representation (Haselock
2010).

In Kosovo in 1999, through UN Security Council Resolution 1224
(UNSCR 1999), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established with Bernard Kouchner as the
Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) (Haselock
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2010). At the time, the international community was increasingly
concerned about the threat of reprisal against Kosovar Albanians
by the Kosovo Serb population, and vice-versa. In May 2000, a
Serb employee of UNMIK was found murdered after an Albanian
newspaper, Dita, published his photograph and personal details
in an article accusing him of crimes against the Albanian
community (Haselock 2010). The next month, the SRSG shut down
the newspaper for eight days on charges of inciting violence, to
the consternation of the local press. There were no grounds for
appeal.

The Kosovo Journalist’s Association, concerned about the
‘dangerous precedent’ of what it saw as an ‘arbitrary decision’
limiting the freedom of the press, asked the UN to reconsider
its decision (Haselock 2010, p. 5). Haselock (2010, p. 6) agrees
that the process by which the decision was made was troubling:

A normative principle for the regulation of any industry,
if it is to be effective and have the cooperation of those
who will be affected by it, is to apply a system of due
process that is understood by the community.

Similar interventions had been imposed previously in other
contexts (in Japan after World War II, and more recently in
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Timor, and the Balkans), and were imposed by the Bremer
Administration to similar effect in Occupation Iraq in 2003. For
example, lack of due process was reflected in the way the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrated
reconstruction, legislation and development in Iraq. This is
particularly apparent in CPA Order 14, in which grave incitement
to violence could result in the immediate closing of the
offending media outlet. CPA Order 14 has been inherited by
Iraq's Communication and Media Commission, which has at times
applied it in ways controversial enough to attract the attention
of the international media watchdog community.

The role and behaviour of local media

Overall, the international community views a free press as one
of the main achievements of the new Balkan democracies. However,
there are experts who recognize the news media’s darker side.
Remzi Lami from the Albanian Media Institute (cited in James
2004, p. 79) stated:

The media may have been driving democratization, but they
have also been an instrument in the hands of nationalist
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forces which brought hatred and bloodshed to the region at
the end of the twentieth century.

In Serbia, the media tycoons, whose closeness to the new
democratic government boosted their growth, were just as close
to the previous regime. In 2004, leading media mogul Bogoljub
Karic and influential banker Ljubomir Mihajlovic had several key
media outlets under their control. Mihajlovic controlled
virtually all of the domestic shares in the country’s most
influential media company, Politika. Karic owned one of the
country’s two mobile phone companies and the leading Internet
provider (James 2004). Zeljko Mitrovic was the owner of Serbia's
Pink TV, which broadcast nationally without a license.
Frequencies were to have been allocated by a neutral
broadcasting council, but the process of nominating council
members was carried out in such a way as to breach the
government’s guidelines for transparency (James 2004).

A similar occurrence happened in Iraq in 2008, when the new
Board of Commissioners (BOC) for Iraq’s Communications and Media
Commission (CMC) was appointed by executive order, casting doubt
on the new BOC’s neutrality. The draft law for the operational
structure and legislated mandate of the CMC, currently under
parliamentary review, contains provisions regarding BOC
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appointments. Unfortunately, these provisions leave the door
open for similar government interference and lack of
transparency.

In the Balkans, as elsewhere around the world, journalists have
fought for regulation of their field, arguing that such policies
and standards are essential for their work to have local and
international legitimacy. However, James (2004, p. 79) notes
that ‘it would seem that this is not enough to prevent the abuse
of power, especially in post-conflict or transitional
societies’. This relates to the issue of inadequate
professionalism; as the Belgrade Media Center (cited in James
2004, p. 78) noted, some journalists lacked ‘professionalism and
were committing breaches of ethical principles either because
they were unaware, or because they assumed this behavior was the
status quo’.

The amount of money spent by international donors in media
development is breathtaking. According to Gillette (2006, p. 1):

Since 1990, international donors have spent at least [US]
$600 million and probably much more on media training and
development in emerging democracies, mostly in Central and

82

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and more
recently in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Gillette (2006, p. 1) defines media development as ‘not only
nurturing independent, professional journalists but also
building a legal and institutional environment to protect, to
professionalize and, in carefully limited ways, to regulate
media’ — noting that the latter point has been inadequately
addressed in some of the instances where regulation is most
needed.

A March 2011 report from the Center for International Media
Assistance (CIMA) estimated that, ‘the US government alone has
spent more than half a billion dollars on media development [in
Iraq] since 2003’ (cited in Ricchiardi 2011, p. 4).

Based on his professional experience in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Haselock proposes that effective media development relies not
only on sufficient financial investments, but also on community
consultation and a sense of local ‘ownership’, a notion that the
international development community seems to have failed to
grasp. It is this ownership that is lacking in many
international media development initiatives. Local ownership is
possible only when all planners and implementers understand and
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appreciate ‘the context, culture and history of a society and
situation’ — an understanding that ‘requires an approach to
communications that places as much emphasis on listening to the
local population as transmitting information to it’ (Haselock
2010, p. 1).

The remaining chapters of this Exegesis include discussions of
the historical context influencing Iraq’s current media
environment, proposed or existing Iraqi media legislation, and
recommendations for the continued development of an enabling
environment for media in contemporary Iraq.
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Chapter 4
History of the media sector in contemporary Iraq

One of the oldest human cultures, Iraq was the ‘cradle of
civilization’. It is where the written word first appeared, in
the ancient Sumerian city of Uruk, five thousand years ago. Here
the first collection of laws, the Code of Hammurabi, was
painstakingly carved into stone and clay tablets about 1772 BC.
It is claimed that one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient
World, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, was situated in Iraq.

Fast-forward to the post-2003 reconstruction, a time when many
hoped and believed Iraq was poised ‘to take its rightful place
as a world leader, respected and admired not only for its
history and culture, but for its embrace of universally accepted
democratic principles’ (Framework for Change 2003).

Working towards a free Iraqi press: 2003-2011

By 2003, the citizens of Iraq had lived through more than three
decades of war, repression, human rights abuses and poverty. The
plan for the reconstruction and development of Iraq’s news media
was rooted in a vision of a free and united Iraq where the
government served the people and was accountable to them. In
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this context, the citizens of Iraq would enjoy peace, justice
and the rule of law in accordance with the principles of
democracy, international law, tolerance and human rights.

This vision, it seemed, could not be realized without free and
independent media that reflected the society accurately and
without bias and created the space to generate debate.

UNESCO (2008, p. 14) reminds us that a free press must be
simultaneously independent and pluralistic; specifically, it
must be:

… independent of governmental, political or economic
control or of control of materials essential for its
production and dissemination, and pluralistic through the
absence of media monopolies and the existence of the
greatest number of print, television, radio, and now, new
media, to reflect the widest possible range of opinion
within that community.

Media independence should always be scrutinized. Insofar as it
seeks the respect afforded to professional media, independent
news media should also strive to adhere to a set of journalistic
standards and principles of good practice that are applicable to
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the specific challenges faced by the profession. Historically
and currently, this subset of media ethics is widely known to
journalists as their professional code of ethics or code of
practice. These codes form the foundation of the canons of
journalism, and they are applied by media companies, newsrooms,
editors and journalists anywhere in the world where freedom of
the press is recognized. Variations of such codes exist in
different countries and contexts, but there is nearly universal
acceptance of the notion that professional journalism should
endeavor to provide audiences with information that is accurate
and impartial.

Representatives of the professional media in Iraq will argue
that they are working to professional codes within their
newsrooms. Indeed, since 2010 the United States Institute of
Peace (USIP) and UNESCO have worked with Iraqi media to develop
user guidelines to help media professionals avoid inciting
violence. Iraqi journalists must also abide by the CMC’s Code
for Media During Elections, which was developed and distributed
prior to the 7 March 2010 Council of Representative elections.

These examples, and others, demonstrate that media in Iraq is
not completely unregulated. However, there are weaknesses in the
institutions responsible for media oversight. Further, there is
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a move by the Government of Iraq (GOI) to over-regulate and
tightly control the media through various pieces of legislation,
thus directly impeding FOE and FOI, as described in the next
chapter.

At this juncture, it is important to understand the history of
Iraq's complicated media landscape as it developed after the
2003 occupation. Prior to the occupation, the generation of
‘news’ was largely controlled by the Ministry of Information as
state-run media. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in
2003, Ricchiardi (2011, p. 4) notes, Iraqi media underwent a
transformation on two fronts:

One was driven by the Americans who poured in half a
billion dollars by most estimates, and the other by the
Iraqis themselves driven to a desire for information after
having been cut off from the free marketplace of news and
ideas.

As in Bosnia and Kosovo, virtually overnight, Iraq’s media
landscape blossomed into one of the most diverse and unfettered
press environments in the Middle East. Privately owned news
outlets grew from zero to more than two hundred and, despite
formidable chaos over press freedom, Iraqi citizens suddenly had
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access to a varied menu of information (Ricchiardi 2011).
Satellite dishes, previously banned under the Ba’athists,
suddenly appeared everywhere. It has been alluded to that the
coalition of the willing helped supply satellite receivers and
certainly helped to unblock un-militarized broadcast channels.

Media regulation, impunity and attacks on journalists:
documented reports

Despite the seeming resurgence of free press and media
proliferation, Reporters Without Borders (2003) issued a report
examining the state of the media in Iraq immediately following
the US invasion. Like other nations that suddenly enjoy
unprecedented freedom after the overthrow of a repressive
regime, Iraq needed to create the mechanisms to establish and
sustain its media. According to the report, the country’s
instability made press freedom very precarious:

Daily lawlessness and instability, the large amount of
weaponry in people’s hands, squabbles between political
groups and the US and British occupation mean complete
freedom is not guaranteed for journalists who are
practicing self-censorship. Criticism and different
opinions can now be voiced, however. The future of the
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Iraqi media is largely in the hands of the US-British
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and, to some extent,
the Iraqi Transitional Governing Council appointed on 13
July.

Iraq’s media sector has been severely affected by the targeting
of journalists in abductions, killings, and acts of
intimidation; imprisonment and prosecution of journalists doing
their job; and restrictions on press activities and FOI.
The following chapters unpack the fragile legislative framework
that exists in Iraq to protect media freedom and fight impunity;
they also explain that although legislation may exist at a
national level and Iraq may have ratified international
conventions protecting freedom of expression, these will do
little to protect media professionals (and their work) on the
ground if not implemented faithfully at the executive,
legislative and judicial levels.

A record number of media professionals, the majority of them
Iraqis, were killed between 2003 and 2008, making it the world’s
most dangerous place for a journalist at that time. According to
the Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO), an Iraqi-based
media watchdog, the incidence of violence against working media
professionals in Iraq in 2011 doubled (JFO 2011) over the
90

previous year. Armed groups and unknown assailants killed at
least five journalists and one media worker, according to the
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ 2012). The fact that
violent attacks against journalists are worsening is
acknowledged in the United Nations General Assembly Human Rights
Council’s unanimous passage, on 21 September 2012, of resolution
A/HRC/21/L6, which was intended to curb such attacks (UNGA
2012).

Despite the glum picture that this paints of media freedom in
Iraq, and despite the fact that Iraq is still unstable and
remains locked in sectarian disunity, there is tremendous room
for improvement — though the road is long, and will remain
fraught with obstacles. As Awad and Eaton (2013, p. 4) note,
‘The seismic shift in attitudes that the Iraqi media (and Iraq’s
government) were asked to embrace in the reconstruction (of the
country) after Saddam Hussein’s fall was always likely to take
time’.

The role of the Coalition Provisional Authority

The existing legal framework for news media in Iraq is complex.
A comprehensive media law, encompassing diverse aspects of media
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legislation does not exist, so the media adhere to a variety of
bodies and pieces of legislation.
Iraq is still in the process of legislating media-related laws —
laws that, on first glance, give the impression that the country
is honoring its human rights obligations by drafting laws
dedicated to freedom of expression, media regulation, and
internet access. However, upon closer analysis and in comparison
to international standards, these pieces of legislation are
pernicious and littered with unclear provisions that could open
the door to state control. These laws must be made more precise,
with all provisions clearly defined, to safeguard against
intentional or accidental misinterpretation. Another current and
related challenge is the increasing controversy within
international and local communities regarding the independence
of Iraq's judiciary and thus its capacity to rule effectively on
such legislation.

Prior to considering individual statutes and their actual or
potential impact (which we will do in the next chapter), it is
helpful to understand how Iraq’s constitution and legal
procedures were developed and implemented by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) under Paul Bremer in 2003.
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The CPA was designed to provide a transitional government in
Iraq. It was established by the US and its allies after the
invasion and in accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1483 (UNSCR 2003). The CPA became the executive,
legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government
(Iraqi Governing Council) from 21 April 2003 until its
dissolution on 28 June 2004.

Two of Paul Bremer’s primary objectives as head of the CPA were
the dismantling of the Iraqi army and the ‘de-Ba'athification’
of Iraqi society. To these ends, Bremer and the CPA disbanded
the army on 23 May 2003, and two months later, on 22 July 2003,
formed the Iraqi Governing Council (the IGC). The IGC consisted
mostly of expatriate Iraqis who had fled the country due to
persecution under Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The IGC functioned under the CPA, and was responsible for
appointing interim ministers to Iraq’s vacant cabinet positions
and representatives to the United Nations.

These documents

remain highly classified, however, the CPA Orders themselves can
be found on line. The CPA with its council in internal
ministers, also drafted a temporary constitution — the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). The IGC signed the TAL on
8 March 2004; it came into effect on 28 June 2004, following the
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official transfer of power from the CPA to the sovereign Iraqi
Interim Government. The TAL remained the law of the land until
the formation of the new Iraqi government in May 2006, when the
TAL was superseded by the permanent constitution that had been
approved by referendum on 15 October 2005.

A note on media and broadcasting in Iraqi Kurdistan

In order to have a discussion of media regulation in
contemporary Iraq, a special note must be made of Iraqi
Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is an autonomous state with its own
central budget and Parliament.

Both Iraq Central and Kurdistan

must be included in this exegesis; it is a matter of political
protocol.

Although Kurdistan has its own autonomous government

separate from the rest of the country – and the Exegesis focuses
on the Iraqi Governorates ruled by the Central Government Kurdistan is part of a constitutional federation within Iraq and
therefore part of the country in many ways. Regulation of
Kurdistan’s media and broadcasting does not fall under the
regulation of the CMC, answering instead to the authority of the
Ministry of Culture and Youth and the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), which regulates and manages the broadcast
spectrum.

94

In 2008, the National Assembly of Kurdistan Iraq adopted the
Essential Law of Journalism in Kurdistan. This law stipulates
the guidelines for print media in Kurdistan, but does not
include the radio or television sectors. Despite its limited
scope, the law is considered a relatively liberal one. The
International Media Support report (IMS 2011, p. 28) summarizes
the law’s basic tenets as follows:

§

A press is free, with no censorship, and with guaranteed
freedom of speech.

§

A journalist has the right to access information of
interest to citizens and the public.

§

A journalist has the right to keep the sources of news and
information obtained secret, unless the court decides
otherwise.

§

Defamation is punished by fines, and not by detention.

Outwardly, media legislation in the KRG seems less restrictive
and more supportive of FOE, but in its application by
authorities, this is certainly not the case. On 17 February
2011, in the Kurdistan city of Sulaimaniya, anti-KRG
demonstrations marked the beginning of the Arab Spring for Iraq
(Kurd Net 2011). Since then, the Metro Center to Defend
Journalists — a watchdog organization and subsidiary arm of
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Iraq's Journalism Freedom Observatory (JFO) — has documented
approximately forty violations against journalists, including
gunshot injuries, arrests and harassment. In 2011, after 62 days
of protest, the Governorate of Sulaimaniya deployed forces in
the city to prevent further demonstrations, and reportedly
occupied the city center. The Security Committee of Sulaimaniya
had placed a ban on all forms of protest as of 18 April 2011.
Thus, despite the KRG’s more liberally perceived media
legislation, in 2011 it was, in fact, one of the worst regions
in the country in terms of violent attacks against journalists.

The lesson we learn from the Kurdistan case is that, as in
greater Iraq, it is not enough to ratify international treaties
creating dedicated legislation that enables independent media;
the laws must be correctly understood, enacted, and upheld on
the ground.

In 2012, observers (who shall remain anonymous for fear of
reprisal) representing national and international human rights
watchdog groups including the United Nations have noted with
concern that Iraq is drafting and enacting legislation to
replace many of the CPA orders with laws that are more
repressive and less closely aligned with Iraq’s constitution. In
the case of media-related legislation, the results have been
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problematic: the legislation put forth seems vague and thus
dangerously open to interpretation. Although, from external
observation, Kurdistan appears to have more progressive legal
reforms on the books, International experts have warned that in
some instances, the legislation could be seen to function as
mechanisms of government control, as we will see in the
examination of specific legislation in the next chapter.

The literature on the subject of media freedom in Iraq is
limited and is authored and published internally and externally
by those human rights watchdog groups with a physical presence
on the ground in Iraq.

Much of the documentation provided in

our discussion is the result of analysis of publically posted
legislation as it appears on the Iraq Council of Representatives
legislative calendar. It must be understood outright that this
calendar is not updated regularly, and only in Arabic. Content
will shift overnight to focus on laws taking greater precedence
in current, or, to ‘fast track’ parliamentary proceedings.

Laws

have been translated and analyzed against the Constitution and
international human rights principles as they relate to freedom
of expression. Such studies have been developed in consultation
with local media freedom NGOs, media workers, Parliamentarians,
and lawyers, as well as international experts and international
human rights bodies (cited in this thesis). Given the relatively
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nascent (10 years, as of 2013) analysis of freedom of press in
post-conflict Iraq, all major studies and their outcomes – as
made publically available - within this domain have been
referenced in the Bibliography of this work, and any information
that has been drawn from the private domain has been credited
anonymously.
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Chapter 5
The regulatory framework for media in Iraq

Legal and policy frameworks relating to the media and press
freedoms are a matter of both form and substance. A country may
have good laws pertaining to FOE or FOI, but if these laws are
not properly implemented or enforced, they do little to support
and uphold a healthy, independent media sector. UNESCO (2010, p.
15) notes: ‘[news media’s] function may be hampered by a culture
of secrecy and corruption, institutional resistance, or a lack
of technical and institutional capacity in the public
administration’. This can certainly be said of Iraq.

Respect for human rights and FOE in Iraq improved after the fall
of Saddam Hussein. Iraq began to see itself as a leader in the
region in regard to human rights and democracy. However, recent
times have seen a dangerous trend in which the legal framework
(within which these rights would be outlined and enjoyed) are
limited, unclear, and manipulated by an increasingly
interventionist government.

A 2011 report from the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD),
written by Toby Mendel and commissioned by IREX (an
international NGO specializing in media development),
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scrutinized five media-related draft laws for their degree of
adherence to international standards in regard to FOE. The
report concluded that new media-related legislation does not
measure up to international standards in two key ways. First,
the government has the power ‘to either refuse or accept, or
obstruct the exercise of’ journalistic freedoms and, second, the
government has ‘failed to honor the internally accepted standard
that those bodies regulating media rights must be free to
operate without government interference’ (CLD 2011a, p. 16). The
same report (p. 17) also notes that without complete
independence from government control, oversight bodies ‘may be
pressured into exercising their powers in a way that undermines
rather than promotes these [media’s] rights’.

Many issues journalists in Iraq currently face fall under the
international human rights mandate. Iraq is a signatory to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR;
UNHCHCR 1966). Furthermore Iraq has participated for the first
time in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a unique process
that involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN
Member States once every four years. The UPR is a state-driven
process under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, which
provides the opportunity for each state to declare what actions
they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their
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countries and to fulfill their human rights obligations. The UPR
in Iraq is ongoing and in progress, the first phase ending in
2014.

In accordance with the UPR Iraq 2010 report released on 15 March
2010 (UNHR 2010), ‘the Government of Iraq has made an active
commitment to legislate for Human Rights and Freedom of
Expression in harmonization with International Human Rights
standards’. The UPR Iraq 2010 report found those international
standards to be reflected in Iraq’s constitution, as follows:

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression in all its
forms, together with freedom of the press, printing,
advertising, information and publication. The right to
freedom of opinion and expression is a fundamental component
of the democratization process that has been underway since
2003. There are no restrictions on the use of satellite
receivers, mobile telephones and the Internet, or on the
establishment of broadcasting stations, the publication of
newspapers and magazines, and the importation of foreign
press materials. Freedom of the press has become a central
feature of the country’s political culture following a long
period of isolation from the rest of the world.
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The report cites the following examples — provided by the
current Iraqi government — as supporting evidence:

§

The number of Internet subscribers rose from 4,500 before
2003 to 261,000 as of April 2007.

§

More than 180 newspapers were published in the first three
months after April 2003, including daily and weekly
newspapers and 40 magazines and periodicals produced by
government institutions.

§

A total of 31 terrestrial and satellite broadcasting
stations were operating in Iraq as of September 2007.

§

There are 80 broadcasting stations operating in the
country.

§

There are eight independent news agencies in Iraq.

§

There are more than 1,100 Iraqi Internet sites.

This major expansion in information and in freedom of opinion
and expression is an indicator of the ongoing democratization –
process and the drive towards the safeguarding of human rights.
It must be noted that Internet sites outside of the IZ did not
benefit from high resolution broadband. Many Iraqi took recourse
in using smart phones in order to better facilitate their access
to one another and to the outside world. When press freedom
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comes under fire, human rights are simultaneously threatened.
Thus, press freedom is an essential factor to the functioning of
a healthy democracy. This notion is commonly held by human
rights instruments throughout the world.

The linkages between

freedom of expression and information, democracy building and
human rights are widely argued, as exemplified by the following
quote from USAID on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day
(USAID 2013):

Free and open media systems give voice to citizens,
truth-test candidates and political parties during
elections, inform policy debates in legislatures,
investigate corruption, hold public officials accountable,
enable democratic governance and facilitate more effective
development.

The positive impact of independent media on governance has been
measured against specific World Bank indicators such as voice
and accountability, political stability and the absence of
violence, the quality of regulation, government effectiveness,
rule of law, and control of corruption (UNESCO 2008), all of
which are essential qualities of a healthy and robust democratic
state.
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The problem of inadequate and/or ill-advised legislation

Although Iraq has passed various pieces of legislation — up to
and including its Constitution --many of these new laws are
pernicious, open to (mis)interpretation, and can be read either
as supporting human rights or clandestinely acting as an arm of
state control over civil society and the media. Key pieces of
legislation affecting journalists and the media include the
following articles of the Iraqi Constitution:

§

Article 38 guarantees freedom of expression through all
means; freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media and
publication, and the freedom of assembly and peaceful
demonstration. Article 38 adds that these freedoms should
not violate public order and morality.

§

Article 39 protects the right to freedom of association.

§

Article 40 guarantees the right of communication and forms
of correspondence.

§

Article 42 guarantees the right to freedom of opinion.

§

Article 44 states: ‘There is no restriction on practicing
any of the rights and freedoms stated in this Constitution
unless by law or according to a law on condition that the
restriction would not harm the essence of the rights of
freedom’.
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These rights all align with Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948, which states
that all human beings should have the right to express their
opinions and exchange ideas freely and without interference or
repercussions in any media, anywhere in the world. In 1966,
Article 19 of the ICCPR reasserted the importance of this same
right.

In the Arab world, UNESCO’s (January 1996) Declaration of the
Seminar on Promoting Independent and Pluralistic Arab Media,
more commonly known as the Declaration of Sana’a, outlines the
basic FOE principles that must be fulfilled in order to
establish a free and pluralistic media. The Declaration was
adopted at UNESCO’s General Conference in November 1997, and
endorsed by all Arab states. The Declaration of Sana’a asserted
that a free press is essential to a democratic society. It
stressed the need for state broadcasters to be editorially
independent from the government, and for journalists to run
media outlets themselves, in order to promote plurality.

Having FOE and FOI laws ‘on the books’ is a good start, but as
we have already seen, those laws need to be upheld and enforced
consistently and impartially in order for them to serve their
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best purpose. This is not the legal environment we find in Iraq
today. In fact, the basis of law in Iraq is still the 1969 Penal
Code, a criminal law inherited from the Saddam Hussein era (Iraq
Penal Code 1969). Under the 1969 Penal Code, speech that incites
violence or public disorder can be punished — with life
imprisonment. Paragraph 226 concerns anyone who ‘publicly
insults’ government institutions or officials, and allows such
people to be imprisoned for up to seven years. Paragraphs 433
and 434 address defamation and insult, either one of which can
be punished by detention lasting up to one year. In paragraph
433, truth appears to be a defense to any prosecution of this
type, but its definition is only loosely defined. Lawsuits
against journalists and media are a daily practice, and so is
impunity when it comes to violations of journalists’ safety at
all levels, up to and including murder.

Similarly, the articles of the Constitution noted earlier in
this section — the ones that sound so full of promise — are
littered with potholes:
§

Article 38 guarantees freedom of expression so long as it
does not violate public order and morality, but the article
fails to define what ‘violating public order and morality’
means.
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§

Article 39 protects the right to freedom of association,
but the incumbent Government routinely attacks civilians
protesting against Maliki’s rule.

Moreover, the Freedom of

Expression, Assembly and Peaceful Protest draft law — as it
exists in its current form — would allow the government to
track protest organizers and participants and who
associates with whom, and for what purposes; and to
threaten and/or take swift retaliatory action against
anyone deemed ‘suspicious’. This could also be interpreted
as anyone acting against the interests of the government.
This will be discussed in further detail in the following
sections.
§

Article 40 guarantees the right of communication and forms
of correspondence, but the draft law on Media and
Telecommunications (Internet) is excessively restrictive
and the fines it allows are severe, and it does not comply
with international norms or standards of best practice.

§

Article 42 guarantees the right to freedom of opinion, but
‘freedom of opinion’ is punishable severely if it is seen
to ‘insult’ the State.

§

Article 44 states that the rights granted by the
Constitution should not be restricted unless such
restriction would not harm the essence of the rights of
freedom. This is problematically vague and allows too-broad
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restrictions on FOE and other rights. Under international
law, restrictions are required to be necessary to protect
one of a limited list of specific interests such as defined
within internationally recognized principles of ‘public
harm’ tests.

In addition to outdated laws enacted under Saddam Hussein, the
laws put in place by the CPA can also be used to restrict
freedom of expression. According to Haselock (2010),

In 2003, due to security concerns of the coalition forces,
the CPA anti-incitement order, CPA Order 14 [Prohibited
Media Activity], was enacted prior to the arrival of the
Media Development Advisory Team (MDAT), and meant that the
administrator, Paul Bremer, could close down media outlets
by fiat and without due process.

In fact, CPA Order 14 has been misused to shut down media
houses, giving the designated authority the power to enforce the
order and impose sanctions directly against the media. CPA Order
14 prohibits media organizations from distributing (through
broadcast, publication, reprinting, or syndicating) any material
that incites violence against any individual or group; incites
civil disorder, rioting, or property damage; incites violence
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against the CPA; advocates changes to Iraq’s borders by violent
means; or that advocates for the return of the Ba’ath Party to
power or makes statements on behalf of the Ba’ath Party.

The CMC, which has been steadily losing its authority to the
Iraqi government, used CPA Order 14 to close the popular
satellite channel Al Baghdadiya on 1 November 2010, claiming
that it had aided terrorists when the Assyrian Christian church
of Sayidat al-Najat (Our Lady of Salvation) was stormed by
members of Islamic State of Iraq, a local Al Qaeda branch. This
took place as an estimated eighty people attended mass. While
holding the worshippers hostage, the militants spoke with Al
Baghdadiya via telephone and voiced their demands on the air.
Two of the station’s employees were charged with inciting
violence and arrested under the anti-terrorism law.

An alternative viewpoint has been offered regarding the closure
of Al Baghdadiya; New York Times reporters John Leland and
Khalid D. Ali (2010) informed their readers that the channel
also hosted a popular morning show where angry Iraqis could air
their frustrations and grievances with the government. Al
Baghdadiya had been targeted by terrorists previously, and its
studios had been bombed earlier that year. In Iraq, it seems,
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media outlets such as Al Baghdadiya must reckon with threats
both from terrorists and the authorities.

The Communications and Media Commission

Iraq’s independent media regulator, the Communications and Media
Commission (CMC), was established in June 2004. It is currently
operating under the legal provisions of Coalition Provisional
Authority Order 65, until superseding communications legislation
is passed. The CMC has exclusive authority to license and
regulate telecommunications, broadcasting and information
technology services in Iraq.

The CMC is an independent regulator and, as such, is not tied to
any government administration; thus reducing the likelihood of
political interference in broadcast media and communications,
while they are overseen by the CMC. The CMC and other
independent commissions, under Article 103, paragraphs 1 and 2
of the Iraqi Constitution, are considered independent
administratively and financially, but are to be ruled by law and
seen as existing within the framework of the Iraqi Parliament
(Iraqi Constitution). An example is the formation of
Parliamentary Committees to appoint board members in a
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transparent manner and in a way that is representative of the
political and ethnic groups in Iraq.

Although it was intended to operate as an independent and
converged regulator, the CMC’s authority has weakened due to a
lack of institutional stability and become less independent over
time as governmental committees exercised control. In 2008, the
current Board of Commissioners was appointed by executive order,
creating a power vacuum under a weakened CEO (Albany Associates
2009). In 2010, after eighteen months with no leadership, a new
board and CEO were appointed. During the eighteen-month interim,
all substantive licensing, regulation, and policy decisions were
postponed until the new senior management structure was in
place. This brought the CMC’s day-to-day regulatory activities
to a virtual standstill, allowing an unregulated communications
and media sector to expand unchecked. For example, until a few
years ago, the CMC provided broadcast licenses to practically
any media outlet that wanted to register, as there were minimal
criteria for licensing. As a result, the airwaves rapidly became
congested. Even after a transition period for the newly
installed CMC management, the CMC has not yet regained control
of broadcasting licenses and is still operating under CPA Order
65.
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There has been a significant legislative push by the Iraqi
government to control the independent commissions and place them
under one of the three governmental branches (legislative,
executive, or judicial). At the beginning of 2011, the CMC was
weakened further when, after being petitioned by the incumbent
government, the Supreme Court made a ruling that threatened to
place the control of all independent commissions under executive
authority. In response to the controversial Supreme Court
ruling, Sabah Saadi, an independent MP and former head of Iraq’s
anti-corruption watchdog group, the Integrity Commission,
stated: ‘the Iraqi people should publicly demonstrate against
this if the decision is pushed through. Putting all the powers
in one pair of hands will bring us another regime like Saddam
Hussein’s’ (cited in Latif & Sands 2011). The CMC’s role as an
independent regulator is clearly under threat.

In October 2011, the CMC suffered another leadership vacuum when
CEO Dr. Burhan Shawi resigned. Since that time, the CMC has been
run by an acting head nominated from the CMC’s Board of
Commissioners. This is an unfortunate example of how even a
fairly good law (CPA Order 65), must be supported by best
practices concerning the recruitment and retention of top-level
managers.
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Draft Law on Media and Telecommunications

The COR is currently considering legislation to regulate the CMC
under Iraqi law; this draft Law on Media and Telecommunications
is known more commonly as the CMC Draft Law. The legislation
currently under consideration would have a detrimental effect on
the independence of the CMC and its ability to carry out its
core mandate. Based on information from the CMC, it appears the
COR is either unaware of, or unconcerned with, the CMC’s
function and importance as an independent regulatory body and
its historic position in the region. The incumbent government is
making a push to transfer the CMC’s authority over media
regulation to the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), a state-owned
public broadcaster. The government is also making a push to
transfer the CMC’s authority over telecommunications (Iraq’s
largest revenue generator after oil) to the Ministry of
Communication.

To some degree, the problems with the new CMC are due to the
delay in forming the new Iraqi government. The CMC has received
some assistance on telecommunications issues, and elections
assistance from United Nations agencies, but currently there is
no mechanism for quick assistance to the new management of the
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CMC on such matters as understanding and implementing its role
as the licensor and regulator of broadcasting in Iraq.

The CMC faced a Parliamentary hearing in November 2012, and as
it stands, the CMC draft law (replacing CPA Order 65) is on
hold. The IMN, which still operates under CPA Order 66, is not
considered an independent state broadcaster, as it was set up to
be; instead, it is viewed as a government broadcaster. The
President of the IMN has the authority to determine the
articles, rules, and instruments by which it operates. In light
of this, the CMC is loath to move forward in its formal
operationalization under Iraqi law until the issue of IMN’s
independence is resolved.

There is a pressing need to raise awareness and understanding
among all stakeholders about the importance of the CMC as an
independent and converged regulator. In addition, key
policymakers and stakeholders need assistance in drafting
legislation regarding the CMC’s authority that is aligned with
international best practices. In particularly urgent need of
clarification are:

§

the roles of government, especially

the Ministry of

Communications
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§

the roles of the Iraqi Media Network and the CMC regarding
broadcast policy and regulation

§

the CMC’s role in reference to its original mandate (as
outlined in CPA Order 65) and the consolidation of the CMCs
responsibilities,

§

and

the CMC’s status as an independent regulatory body within
the current legislative, legal, and political landscape of
Iraq in 2011 and beyond.

Not only is legislation perceptibly threatened by the
possibility of government control of the CMC’s work, even the
oversight bodies in charge of monitoring regulation and human
rights have been targeted in efforts to undermine their
independence.

According to the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD 2011a, pp.
18-19), ‘the draft CMC law currently before the parliament
illustrates the failure to ensure that regulatory bodies are
sufficiently insulated from government control’. The key
oversight body established within this draft law is the Board of
Trustees of the CMC. Article 11 of the draft law provides for
nine full-time board members to be nominated by the cabinet and
appointed by the parliament.
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This complete lack of consultation with civil society or media
stakeholders in the exclusive nomination process is problematic.
Best practice would dictate that board members be appointed
through a transparent process or voted in by the public. The CLD
(2011, p. 19) warns that this ‘poses a direct threat of
interference, when appointments should either be made directly
by the parliament or through some other means that ensures
greater transparency and involvement from outside actors’.

The need for independent broadcast regulators finds strong
support internationally, and this was emphasized in the 2003
Joint Declaration adopted on 18 December 2003 of the (then)
three specialized mandates for the protection of freedom of
expression: the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the
Media, and the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. The OSCE (2003) stated:

All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory
powers over the media should be protected against
interference, particularly of a political or economic
nature, including by an appointments process for members
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which is transparent, allows for public input, and is not
controlled by any political party.

According to Article 18 of the draft CMC law, the general
manager or CEO of the CMC is to be recommended by the board and
appointed by parliament, thus opening the door for political
interference.

Other articles of this law are also problematic, as they pose
restrictions on content or contain poorly defined provisions
that give control of censorship to those who may have an
interest in limiting press freedom. For example, the CLD (2011,
p. 14) notes:

Article 2 (5) lists as one of the aims of the law to protect
individuals against defamation, backed up by Article 2 (10),
which aims to promote the effective mechanisms of selfcensorship through Article 34 (1), which designates the CMC
Media Consultants Department for developing the media policy
framework to promote self-censorship.

Disturbingly, as Article 26 of the draft law states:

If the general manager has sufficient reasons to believe that
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any of the media broadcasting telecommunications operations
pose a threat to public health or regulations he has the
right to immediately suspend it with the approval of the
board of trustees, until the hearings and complaints
department rapidly reviews this matter.

To which the CLD (2011, p. 14) responds:

It is not the role of media to provide a parallel system for
addressing defamation; this should be done through civil law
and the power of the general manager to suspend a media
outlet, even if for a relatively short amount of time, is
draconian and unnecessary.

Another important element in unpacking the relationship between
media and democracy, and between information and power, in
nascent democracies such as Iraq, lies in the media’s ability to
report on elections in an informed and transparent manner. The
Independent High Electoral Commission (Iraq) was first
established in 2004 as the Independent Election Commission of
Iraq (IECI) by CPA Order 92. The IECI was the exclusive
electoral authority in Iraq.
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In 2007, the IECI was renamed the IHEC, in accordance with Law
11 (2007) of the Council of Representatives (COR). The IHEC is a
professional, independent and neutral commission subject to COR
oversight like the CMC. The IHEC has the exclusive authority to
announce, implement and deliver regulations, rules and
procedures related to referenda and elections. The IHEC is
responsible for ensuring that Iraqi citizens can participate in
decision-making processes through their elected representatives
and for the peaceful delegation of authority.

The authority of the CMC and the IHEC overlaps during election
campaigns and vote-counting periods. The CMC regulates media,
while the IHEC regulates coverage and activity of candidates and
political parties. Thus, coordination is required between both
commissions. The media learn how to report on elections and
related issues impartially and professionally by using both the
CMC and IHEC Code of Conduct for Media During Elections.

In this regard, improvements are needed in the following areas
of coordination:

§

Enhancing the capacity, knowledge and expertise of the IHEC
in media relations and the CMC as it relates to IHEC during
electoral periods.
119

§

Promoting dialogue and partnerships between the IHEC, the
CMC and the media.

§

Raising Iraqi media’s awareness of electoral issues and
improving its capacity to analyse and report on electoral
events, processes and results in a professional and
impartial manner.

§

Promoting appropriate and equitable public access to
information on electoral processes and campaigns.

§

Supporting development and implementation of the legal
framework relating to media coverage of elections.

§

Clarifying distinct roles between the CMC and IHEC, rather
than continuing with the current overlap.

While challenges remain, there have been some recent bright
spots. Notable among these were the 2009 Provincial Council
elections and 2010 Parliamentary Elections, which were
remarkable for the low levels of violence that accompanied the
vote. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists and the
Iraqi Nonviolence Group, there were only a handful of incidents
of violence directed against media professionals reporting these
elections. Naturally, vigilance is still required, as the media
is one of the central institutions of electoral processes and
attacks on the media while reporting impartially on elections is
an attack on the legitimacy of the process itself.
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The 2009 and 2010 elections were also noted for the innovative
public outreach campaigns launched by the IHEC — using new
media: the IHEC website, blogs, SMS, and YouTube as well as
traditional radio, TV, and print media. Commentators agreed that
the 2009 and 2010 elections witnessed unprecedented and
intensive media debates on critical issues related to minority
rights, the Status of Forces Agreement, electoral quotas for
women, and other topics. While this can be attributable to many
factors — including subsiding levels of violence, increased
access to convergent technology and a growing professionalism of
the mass media — it is also fair to say that the electoral
institutions’ increased capacity to engage with each other, and
this researcher, meant that citizens were able to access
information about the electoral process and those institutions
more easily, and factored that information into the decisions
they made at the polls.

The CMC played an important role in monitoring election-related
content during the critical campaign period as well as in the
run-up to and aftermath of the announcement of election results.
Dialogue between the CMC and the IHEC was initiated, which
ultimately led to the two commissions jointly updating the 2005
Code of Conduct for the Media During Elections. The
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transformation of Iraq into a stable democracy must include many
more such demonstrations of the country’s respect and
recognition of the importance of free media, especially during
crucial and sensitive periods such as elections.

Draft Journalist Protection Law and the Journalist Rights Law

The United Nations Country Teams’ Iraq Briefing Book (2011, p.
77) cited ‘weak professional associations or understanding of
self-regulatory mechanisms or practices’ as being a ‘key issue’
posing ‘a threat to the health of an independent Iraqi media
sector’. In particular, the report cited ‘the support given to
the draft Journalist Protection Law (JPL)’, which it defined (p.
77) as follows:

[The draft JPL] is a retrogressive act that could
potentially undermine the professionalism and independence
of the media sector, and whose introduction by the Iraqi
Journalists Syndicate in 2009 led to widespread
mobilization among media professionals for a fuller debate
on their sector.

The draft JPL had made several appearances over the previous few
years, and represented more of a threat to freedom of the press
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than a useful piece of legislation addressing the basic
protection needs of reporters.

In early to mid-April, 2011, UNESCO was informed that there was
pressure within the COR to pass the JPL and that it would be
reviewed during a parliamentary conference on 30 April 2011.
Toby Mendel (of the Centre for Law and Democracy) and Sejal
Parmer (of ARTICLE 19), both experts on international media law,
helped draft the recommendations for the JPL. Their comments and
analyses were translated into Arabic and presented at the
conference.

The translated analyses of the JPL were distributed to media,
media advocacy groups, civil society parties, and to members of
parliament. Awareness-raising meetings were held in Iraq,
sometimes attended by this researcher, and the third reading of
the JPL subsequently stalled. Meanwhile, UNESCO continued to
raise awareness regarding the inherent dangers of the draft JPL
to journalists’ independence, if the law was passed without
alterations.

Both ARTICLE 19’s and the Center for Law and Democracy’s (CLD)
analyses were highly critical of the draft JPL. UNESCO had
officially expressed its concerns about the law to the Iraqi
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government, recognizing that the process was fundamentally an
Iraqi one, but also one that should be conducted with a full
range of opinions and analyses available in order for Parliament
to make an informed decision.

The CLD’s most serious issue with the proposed legislation was
that it would vest the Iraqi Journalists Syndicate with the
exclusive power to determine who could be defined as a
journalist (CLD 2011c). This would place pressure on journalists
to join the Syndicate, contrary to their rights to freedom of
expression and association. The CLD argued that the benefits
allocated by the JPL should ‘accrue to anyone who regularly
disseminates information of public interest, regardless of their
organizational or institutional affiliations’ (CLD 2011c, p. 3).

Another concern was that the law narrowly defines a journalist
as someone who works full-time, effectively excluding part-time
journalists, bloggers and other individuals involved in
disseminating news. Although the law does offer journalists
compensation in cases of death or injury, among other benefits,
it falls short by narrowly defining who would be covered.

The law suffers from additional ambiguity in stating that media
groups must register ‘under the law’, but does not specify which
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law is meant. It goes on to say that journalists have the ‘right
to obtain information, news, statements, and statistics … within
the limits of the law’, but again fails to indicate any specific
law. The ambiguities here create unnecessary barriers in
accessing information.

The CLD (2011, p. 2) made its conclusion clear:

Although many of the provisions in the draft law appear to
be for the benefit of journalists, the real underlying
rationale is to safeguard the flow of information to the
public. In other words, if the free flow of information and
ideas from journalists and others who disseminate
information in the public interest is not protected,
everyone will suffer.

Another danger is that the JPL could be used to discriminate
against other journalism associations. The CLD (2011, p. 2) had
another serious concern about the law as drafted:

[T]he law serves to elevate the Journalists Syndicate to a
mandatory membership body, since no journalist will wish to
be denied the very significant benefits that membership
brings, and [the draft law] is thus a breach of the right
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to freedom of association, as well as the right to freedom
of expression.

The Syndicate itself has been the source of some controversy,
apparently having aligned itself within the last few years to
Prime Minister Maliki’s government, which has been heavily
criticized for being too authoritarian. The CLD proposed that
the entire approach in drafting this law be reevaluated,
especially regarding the law’s rigid strategies for dealing with
crimes against journalists, its limits on access to information,
and its unduly broad grounds for refusing access.

The JPL was passed on 9 August 2011 as the Journalist Rights Law
(JRL). Provisions regarding the definition of ‘journalist’ as a
media professional licensed by the Syndicate were omitted.
Nonetheless, the law remains deeply flawed, and media advocacy
groups are contesting its constitutional legality.

For example, on 24 January 2012, the Committee to Protect
Journalists released a report (CPJ 2012) stating that the JRL
falls short of international standards and should be repealed.
This was in response to the Iraqi media advocacy group, the
Society for Defending Press Freedom, challenging the law in the
Federal Supreme Court of Iraq on 23 January 2012, on the grounds
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that the law further serves to undermine press freedom above and
beyond existing laws in Iraq; these pre-existing laws include
the 1968 Publications Law, which allows journalists to be
imprisoned for up to seven years for insulting the government,
and the 1969 Penal Code, which criminalizes defamation.

Currently, all three laws (the 1968 Publications Law, the 1969
Penal Code, and the JRL) are applicable to journalists in Iraq.
Further criticism comes from Mohamed Abdel Dayem, CPJ’s Middle
East and North Africa program coordinator, who believes the law
‘fails to protect journalists’ and that ‘[w]hat the government
has done is pile one badly written law on top of at least two
older, restrictive laws. The result is a legal nightmare for
journalists’ (cited in CPJ 2012). Likewise, Oday Hatem,
president of the Society for Defending Press Freedom said, ‘If
Iraq wants to afford journalists rights, they should amend the
existing laws, not keep the old ones from Saddam’s era and add
new ones that provide no added value’ (cited in CPJ 2012).

According to the CPJ’s January 2012 report, although the law had
been in effect for several months, it apparently offered little
protection for journalists. On 24 January 2012, the CPJ reported
that on Thursday, 19 January 2012:
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Ali al-Fayad, a reporter for the daily Al-Zaman in the
Wasit governorate in central Iraq, was released after being
detained for five days without a judicial warrant, an
action that [Article 10 of] the law allegedly prevents …
The journalist was told he was detained for writing about
the termination of police officers’ jobs in Wassit.

Draft Law on Freedom of Expression, Assembly, and Peaceful
Protest

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1948, protects the rights to
freedom of expression and assembly. The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a legally binding treaty,
was ratified by Iraq on 25 January 1971. The ICCPR guarantees
freedom of expression in Article 19, and freedom of assembly in
Article 21.

Article 38 of the Iraqi Constitution indicates that:

The state guarantees in a way that does not violate public
order and morality: A. Freedom of expression, through all
means. B. Freedom of press, printing, advertisement, media
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and publication. C. Freedom of assembly and peaceful
demonstration. This shall be regulated by law.

In its current form, the Draft Law on Freedom of Expression,
Assembly, and Peaceful Protest imposes undue restrictions on
freedom of assembly, including complex and unreasonable
requirements for prior authorization of assemblies that is
inconsistent with international law. It also includes a number
of broad and vague content restrictions, which go beyond what is
permitted under international law. This law was drafted in order
to replace CPA Order 19, which reads as follows:

Concerned by the exploitation of demonstrations by persons
intent on inciting violence against the Iraqi people, the
CPA and Coalition Forces, noting that the provisions of the
Third Edition of the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code, Part Two,
Chapter Two, at paragraphs 220 to 222 unreasonably restrict
the right to freedom of expression and the right of
peaceful assembly, determined to remove the unacceptable
restrictions on human rights of the former Iraqi Ba’ath
Party regime, and to promote the freedom of the Iraqi
people to demonstrate in a peaceful and orderly manner.
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As noted previously, freedom of expression is guaranteed in
Article 19 of the UDHR, and Article 20 (1) states: ‘Everyone has
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association’ (UDHR
1948). These rights are also protected in other international
and regional human rights instruments, such as the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR), and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). International law recognizes that
freedom of assembly is not absolute, but places clear and strict
conditions on the restrictions of these rights.

If restrictions are unclear, as in the case of the Freedom of
Expression draft law currently in front of the Iraq Parliament,
the CLD (2011, p. 6) warns that they may be interpreted in a way
that:

… gives them different meanings, and which for the
authorities may act as an invitation to abuse, or seek to
apply them in situations which bear no relation to the law,
or to the legitimate aim sought to be protected.

Best practice dictates that ‘harm’ tests be considered in order
to assess the relevance or necessity of imposing restrictions
(as clearly outlined in Articles 19 through 22 of the ICCPR),
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and that any restrictions must take into consideration several
factors: ‘laws meet certain criteria of clarity and
accessibility to the public; restrictions must not be arbitrary,
must be rationally connected to the objective they seek to
promote, must impair rights as little as possible, and must be
proportionate to a legitimate aim’(CLD 2011a, p. 7).

The current draft law on freedom of expression, assembly, and
peaceful demonstration is limited in its very definition of
freedom of expression in reference to public morals. Article 8
(4) of the law states:

It is permitted for the participants of a public assembly
to raise banners, chant slogans, and give statements to
media outlets on the condition that they do not disrupt the
public order or public morals.

Although a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights has no
official value in Iraq, the ECHR (cited in CLD 2011a, p. 11)
takes issue with this view, stating:

Freedom of Expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of [a democratic society] … [It] is applicable
not only to information or ideas that are favorably
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received … but also to those which offend, shock, or
disturb the State or any other sector of the population.

Not surprisingly, the CLD (2011, p. 10) sides with the European
Court of Human Rights on this point:

[R]eference to, and restrictions imposed to safeguard,
public morals must go beyond insulting people and should
look at what constitutes an overall harm to society, whilst
at the same time recognizing that public morals of a
society are multifarious in nature affected and contained
within a diversity of social and cultural traditions.

In addition to the characteristically troubling lack of clear
definitions of terms such as ‘public morals’, ‘public modesty’
and ‘social values’, there are other serious problems with this
law. Perhaps the gravest of these is the overt restriction on
public protest, which in the law’s current form require
authorization from special state-run bodies. This is detailed in
the first four paragraphs of Article 7 of the Draft Law on
Freedom of Expression, Assembly, and Peaceful Protest, which
reads as follows:
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1. Citizens have the right to hold public assemblies after
obtaining prior authorization from the head of the
administrative unit at least five (5) days prior to the
event. The request shall include the topic of the assembly,
its purpose, and its place and time and the names of the
organizing committee.
2. The organizing committee mentioned in the (first) item of
this article shall consist of a president and at least two
other members. If the members of the committee are not
identified, the names included in the request form shall be
considered the de facto members of the organizing
committee. The organizing committee shall be responsible
for properly managing the assembly, fulfilling its
obligations as prescribed by the law, and protecting the
assembly in coordination with the relevant entities.
3. If the head of the administrative unit refuses the request
to hold a public assembly, the president of the organizing
committee has the right to appeal to the court with the
relevant jurisdiction. The court shall adjudicate the
matter urgently.
4. Organizers of the assembly or one of the applicants must be
informed of the decision of rejection according to the
third item of this Article at least twenty four (24) hours
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prior to the time of the assembly. The process of informing
shall take place according to the methods specified by law.

Article 7 establishes the right of citizens to have a public
assembly and Article 10 (1) gives citizens the right to
demonstrate, but they must first obtain authorization via an
authorization form from the unspecified ‘head of the
administrative unit’ at least 5 days prior to the planned
demonstration. The law does not stipulate who will make up this
administrative unit, or how officials will be nominated and
appointed to the unit.

The fact that this law requires authorization in advance, for
any type of public assembly, contravenes accepted international
standards. The Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly —
commonly referred to as the Venice Commission Guidelines
(OSCE/ODIHR 2010) — are respected internationally and state
that: ‘those wishing to assemble should not be required to
obtain permission to do so’, and further state that: ‘it is not
necessary under international human rights law for domestic
legislation to require advance notification of an assembly’
(cited in CLD 2011a, p. 18). Although the Venice Commission
Guidelines exist outside of the Iraqi context, they nonetheless
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serve as useful examples of internationally accepted rights
standards.

Draft Law on Information Technology Crimes (Internet)

At the time of the Exegesis’ original iteration (2012), the
Draft Law on Information Technology Crimes (Internet) was of
great concern to Iraqi citizen journalists and International
Freedom of Expression Rights groups. It was strongly contested
by lobbyist groups, and appeals were made to the Iraqi
Government to amend the law. In 2013, after significant
agitation by Iraqi Civil Society Groups, the draft law was taken
off the legislative calendar to be re-drafted at a later date.

As with the draft law for freedom of expression, the provisions
in the Information Technology Crimes draft law are ill-defined
and lack clarity, thus leaving the door open for
misinterpretation and/or intentional manipulation. In addition
to this, the penalties for supposed breaches are unusually
severe when compared to internationally accepted best practice,
such as those described in the Berne Copyright Convention, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), and the World Intellectual Property Office
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty.
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Once again, the question of public good or moral rights is
inadequately defined regarding the dissemination of sensitive
materials. In Article 22(2)(a), managing or assisting the
establishment of a website that promotes or encourages
pornography or any programs, information, images or videos that
breach ‘public modesty and morals’ will incur fines of up to 30
million Iraqi dinars (approximately US$25,750 in late 2012) and
imprisonment for up to three years (CLD 2011a, p. 10).

In a similar vein, Article 21(3) stipulates that anyone who
violates the principles, ‘religious, moral, family, or social
values’, or personal privacy through the use of computers in any
way (with no discrimination between e-mailing, blogging, posting
on social media sites, etc.) shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less than a year and a fine of between 2 million and 5
million Iraqi dinars (US$1,717 to US$4,292 in late 2012).

However, Article 4 of the Information Technology Crimes law
imposes some of the most serious penalties of all, a most severe
attenuation of journalism.

Article 4 states:

A penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
twenty-five million Iraqi dinars and not more than fifty
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million Iraqi dinars shall be sentenced on whoever
establishes or manages a website with deliberate intent to
commit one of the following acts:
1. Implement programs or ideas which are disruptive to
public order or promote or facilitate their
implementation.
2. Implement terrorist operations under fake names or
facilitate communication with members or leaders of
terrorist groups.
3. Promote terrorist activities and ideologies or publish
information regarding the manufacture, preparation, and
implementation of flammable or explosive devices or any
tools or materials used in the planning or execution of
terrorist acts.

For a stark reminder of the extreme nature of these fines alone
— not to mention life imprisonment — it is helpful to note that
the average annual income in Iraq is roughly US$3,300.

Addressing terrorism and security, and thus public disorder and
incitement to public disorder, are clearly within the rights of
states and of great importance to Iraq, but are not clearly
defined in this law in the manner expected by international
standards. Furthermore, the CLD (2011, p. 12) argues:
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[The] prohibited acts in this law exceed what is normally
understood as terrorism and inciting public disorder and
include undermining the constitution, jeopardizing national
interests, sending threatening or insulting messages or
fabricated news, promoting terrorist ideologies (as opposed
to terrorism per se), and publishing information about the
manufacture of tools or materials used in terrorist acts. …
Promoting terrorism ideologies is not the same thing as
inciting actual terrorism … Finally, publishing information
relating to the manufacture of tools used in terrorism is
also not legitimate. … Terrorists by and large use tools that
are used for many other purposes, some of which are perfectly
innocuous, such as computers, and others of which are, if not
innocuous, certainly not under a cloak of secrecy, such as
guns.

But the Information Technology Crimes draft law has some even
more absurd restrictions regarding content. Pursuant to Article
6(2), a penalty of temporary or life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than twenty-five million Iraqi dinars and not more than
fifty million Iraqi dinars shall be sentenced on whoever uses
computers and information networks with deliberate intent to
provoke or promote armed disobedience, or threaten to do so,
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provoke religious or sectarian strife, disturb public order, or
harm the reputation of the country.

As the CLD (2011, p. 15) points out, ‘It is widely recognized
that States as such do not have reputations, and to impose
penalties on their behalf for ruining their reputations is not
considered valid’, and goes on to argue that in fact states,
government bodies, and all types of public authorities should be
prohibited from bringing any such defamation claims against
citizens.

The same extreme punishments are called for in Article 6(4),
which is equally offensive to the notion of free speech. Article
6(4) reads as follows, prohibiting:

… the broadcasting of false or misleading facts with intent
to weaken trust in the electronic financial system or
electronic trading and monetary currencies and the likes, or
to damage the national economy or the financial trust of the
state.

The CLD (2011, p. 15) responds:

Content such as this is par for the course for any financial
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or investigative reporter practicing in a country that
supports a free press. Furthermore the crime is not rendered
legitimate by the requirement that the news be false … [and]
conditioning crimes by reference to falsity does not bring
them into conformity with the right to freedom of expression.
Even the very best journalists make mistakes, in part due to
the need to report in a timely fashion in the public
interest, and it is simply not appropriate to criminalize
this behavior.

These are only some of the problems within the Information
Technology Crimes draft law when analyzed against international
best practice. What would be of great significance to Iraq, and
what would have a great positive impact on the legislative
framework through which FOE can be exercised and regulated in
accordance with international best practice, would be the
introduction of a Right to Information Act. Furthermore, this
would help curb the pre-existing culture of mutual suspicion
between public bodies and the media.

Right to Information and Right to Privacy Acts

Legislated access to information should be the right of every
Iraqi citizen, and is one of the critical foundations for the
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development of a healthy and functioning democracy. The Iraqi
constitution ratified in 2005 clearly confirms that the people
are the source of authority. Articles 38, 39, 40, 42 and 44 of
the Iraqi constitution guarantee freedom of opinion and speech
as rights and freedoms without which a democratic society cannot
emerge or sustain itself. A principal feature of a functioning
legal framework, which supports an independent media sector and
the public’s right to know, is legislated freedom of information
allowing the people access to public documents created in the
course of doing the people’s business.

There is far more at stake here than a mere journalistic tool:
The Iraqi economy will not rest on oil, but on diversification.
The World Bank considers access to information a key factor in a
strong economy, a consideration for foreign investment, and a
bulwark against corruption. Iraq still lacks the legal mechanism
that guarantees the citizens’ right to have access to
information, even when such information concerns the interests
of citizens (such as public sector contracts, bids, development,
and reconstruction programs). The citizens, in addition to media
workers, want access to information, yet in the absence of a
binding legal text granting it, they are confronted with
bureaucratic procedures and measures that are often subject to
personal desires to conceal information under various pretexts
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(public ethics, higher interests, national security, and other
elastic terms that wrongly restrict the public’s right to know).

Corruption consumes a huge share of Iraq’s resources, delaying
reconstruction projects and slowing development. Transparency
International (2013) estimates that US$800 million are
transferred out of Iraq every week, and in 2012 Iraq ranked
eighth out of 173 countries monitored in the 2012 Corruption
Perceptions Index. The same report quotes a former Iraqi
minister as saying, ‘Corruption today is worse than ever. It’s a
disaster’ (Transparency International 2013). Iraq’s economy will
never reach its full potential and its people will never have
the opportunity to fulfill their aspirations if the government
does not actively embrace basic principles such as the right to
information and the right to privacy.

It is generally agreed that Right to Information (RTI) and Right
to Privacy (RTP) acts are related tools that help individuals
make governments accountable. In addition to the right to
information as substantiated through international law, the
right to privacy is similarly considered as a human right in a
modern information society. At an international level, the
modern privacy benchmark can be found in the 1948 Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically protected
territorial and communications privacy. Article 12 states:

No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks
on his honour or reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interferences or
attacks.

This derives from the right of freedom of expression to seek and
receive information. RTI acts generally refer to the right of
the individual seeking information from public bodies. The right
to information is ‘requisite for the very existence of
democracy’ (OAS 2003, cited in Banisar 2011, p. 5). ‘Democracy
is based on the consent of the citizens, and that consent turns
on the government informing citizens about its activities and
right to participate’ (Banisar 2011, p. 5).

RTP laws guarantee that individuals will control the collection
of, access to, and use of personal information about themselves.
This information may be held by governments and private bodies
alike. Definitions of privacy vary in different countries and
are be influenced by past experiences and the collective
cultural understanding. Banisar (2011, p. 8) explains:
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The legal right to privacy is covered in nearly every
national constitution and in most human rights treaties, or
may be covered in a nation’s criminal and civil rights code
in outlining the restriction of use of personal
information.

Banisar (2011, p. 6) notes, ‘Today, nearly 90 countries have
adopted a national law or regulation that sets out specific
rights and duties for facilitating access to information’.

RTI and RTP acts are complementary, not contradictory, yet there
is no simple way of balancing the two. Doing so requires clear
definitions in legislation, guidelines, techniques, and
oversight systems. Banisar (2011, p. 33) says it is critical
‘that governments take acute care when drafting the laws to
ensure that access to information and data protection laws have
compatible definitions of personal information’ as well as
adopting ‘appropriate public interest tests that allow for the
careful balancing of the two rights’. He also notes that the
proper institutional structures need to be created to ‘balance
these rights and ensure that data protection and right to
information officials work together even if they represent
different bodies’ (Banisar 2011, p. 33).
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Efforts have been made to draft an RTI act for Iraq. In December
2010, Iraqi legislators, public officials, civil society and
media advocacy groups convened in Beirut for a three-day
conference.

They were to discuss the current status of RTI

legislation in Iraq, and an initial first draft was produced.
The workshop was organized by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) in collaboration with ARTICLE 19. Participants
from Iraq were joined by international experts in the fields of
media law and FOI. Discussion topics included current legal
protection of the right to information in Iraq, the impact of
Iraqi media law on this protection, and the creation of Iraq’s
draft RTI law. The objectives of this workshop were to promote
the adoption of an RTI law in Iraq that meets international
standards, highlight the strengths and weaknesses of domestic
RTI laws and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed
legislation on RTI, share good practices and comparative
experiences from other countries, and identify the key
implementation issues that will need to be addressed when an RTI
law is adopted in Iraq.

While writing this exegesis, I received a private communication
by email, stating that although efforts have been made since
December 2010 among civil society and media advocacy groups
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working on various draft versions of Iraq’s RTI law, no
definitive version exists to be presented to the Parliament for
discussion and approval.
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Chapter 6
Journalists and journalism in contemporary Iraq:
a state of fundamental insecurity

The exponential increase in Internet use in contemporary Iraq
has greatly expanded the ability of individuals, groups, and
others to enhance their freedom of expression. It has also
ushered in an era of unprecedented opportunity for government
surveillance of communications between countless groups and
individuals — often at the expense of those individuals’ and
groups’ safety and security.

The decentralization of information brought by the Internet has
empowered citizens, including the researcher, to access
information, express themselves, and participate in public
debate more than ever before. Even in places such as Iraq, where
Internet penetration rates are relatively low, but growing
exponentially, citizens are using mobile phones to send
information via text messages, images, and video clips. By
micro-blogging via mobile phones and other Internet-compatible
tools, political dissidents living under repressive regimes have
been able to tell the outside world exactly what is happening in
their countries, in real time.
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During the course of the research, I compiled the equivalent of
more than 500 pages of communications from Iraqis. The following
excerpts (presented as originally written) are representative of
the decentralization of information and the newly widespread
ability of average people to share their views with relative
ease (although not always without repercussions).

The high speed and unrestricted Internet access available to
this research, by way of the UNESCO Internet access, meant that
all sorts of communiqués, including video, arrived for discourse
analysis and citation.

Dear Karin,
Well... sorry to shock you with the bitter reality that
nobody does pay attention or even cares for such a
dangerous problem...

not even the IJS [Iraqi Journalism

Syndicate]... nor the union... and that the main reason
behind X’s assassination was this issue... he was the man
in charge in the IJS 3 years ago and he was to be killed
when he started to call for more freedom and rights for the
Iraqi journalists. generally, unions, leagues, and other
institutions work according to the principal of fear, money
and benefit... and all this goes in the same trend that the
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Iraqi political face is moving since those institutions
work for one purpose ... money.
(e-mail, 10 February 2011)

To Iraqi Government
Please allow us to explain our needs
If you will use violence with us
I think, you will lost you people in the future
Please let’s talk about our condition.
Iraqi Citizen.
(Facebook, 23 February 2011)

Yesterday I was beaten by Iraqi security forces, and they
broke my camera, then arrested me, and I stayed until today
at noon when they released me. It was very bad day.
(Facebook, 25 February 2011)

Further to our conversation yesterday regarding attacks on
the press, I spoke to three journalists, including X, X’s
correspondent, and a friend. She reported that her driver
was beaten and her photographer roughed up by
police/military. She also relayed a disturbing story where
thugs were allowed to attack with knives a group of peace
activists who were holding a sit-in. I say “allowed” as the
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thugs passed through a line of riot police to enter the
area where activists were gathered and no one intervened
during the attack. Several people were stabbed.

There is

more on this at:
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/25/iraq-open-immediateinquiry-protester-deaths.
(e-mail, 28 February 2011)

It has been reported to me that Internet providers are
being shut down in various provinces throughout Iraq in
order to quash the networking and communication concerning
the organization of protests. Can this be in any way
further confirmed?
(e-mail, 4 March 2011)

We are the journalists and media workers who sign below
announce our boycott to the activities of the general
commander and Baghdad operation till they offer their
official apology with clear guarantee to never do again
what had happen in 25 of February 2011 and what did before
that from abusing performances against media covering to
the demonstration and arresting our colleagues who work in
different media fields after that. We call all the sides
who ordered to prevent, arresting and beaten the journalist
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to send them to Iraqi judicial because what had happen in
25 of February was against the freedom of opinion, free
speech, values of freedom and democracy and that will
prepare to produce a new dictatorship.
(e-mail, 6 March 2011)

To the President of Iraq Republic
To the President of Iraqi Parliament
Greeting
we condemns in our name and the name of all the civil
society activists and Iraqi bloggers and on behalf of every
Iraqi citizen who tries to exercise his the rights within
Iraqi constitution, which went out to vote for under the
threats of terrorism, we raise your condemnation of the
ongoing attacks against demonstrators in tahreer Square and
the failure of troops to secure their safety, but on the
contrary troops supported the infiltrators who tries to
sabotage the demonstrations.
Today one of the founding member of our site and civil
society activists and free Iraqi citizen suffered brutal
attack and was severely beaten in front of the eyes of army
troops without your security forces try to move, is this
our new and this democracy that we fight for it?
http://www.iraqistreets.com/archives/3569
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(Facebook, 23 April 2011)

Throughout the Arab Spring uprisings, it became evident that the
use of new media had become a force to be reckoned with, and
that such new mechanisms for sharing information had the power
to mobilize people so they might demand civil and human rights:
to the extent of toppling governments and holding individuals,
even corporations, to account. The wide use of social media,
even new journalism practice and the accessibility of ‘new
media’, were at the heart of this mass mobilization throughout
the Arab region, and indeed the world. As K. Anderson (20112012, p. 74) observed:

In the Middle East and North Africa, in Spain and Greece
and New York, social media and smart phones did not replace
face-to-face social bonds and confrontation but helped
enable and turbo-charge them, allowing protesters to
mobilize more nimbly and communicate with one another in
the wider world more effectively than ever before.

The darker side of ‘free’ communication

Although the enhanced ability to communicate across borders and
other boundaries was a welcome development for most citizens, it
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came at a particularly high cost to professional journalists. As
a result of the demonstrations in Iraq and throughout the
region, the international community witnessed countless human
rights violations targeted at journalists, bloggers, and civil
rights activists who were threatened, beaten, tortured, or even
killed; made to sign false confessions; or who had their
equipment destroyed or offices ransacked.

This is the darker side of social media: it gives rise to the
possibility of authoritarian regimes observing and repressing
its use, and punishing its users. The Information Technology
Crimes Law, as written in its current draft form, poses a real
threat to FOE rights for all Iraqi citizens, especially
journalists who make obtaining and sharing information their
life’s work. Kenneth Roth (2012, p. 15), whose article Time to
abandon the autocrats and embrace rights opened the 2012 Human
Rights Watch Report, believes that ‘strong global standards are
needed to better protect the freedom of privacy of Internet
users’. Under the current draft law, governments could
essentially spy on Internet users and then penalize those they
define as ‘activists’ (individuals who have criticized the
constitution, for example).
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In Iraq, thousands of protestors and activists took to the
streets in February 2011 to ask their government to provide
better services and end corruption. Protestors were often
targeted, either by the destruction of equipment such as cameras
and mobile phones or with threats of physical harm. As we will
see in the next section, journalists were not spared in these
attacks. This harassment was documented in the Human Rights
Watch report released on 22 January 2012 (HRW 2012, p. 560):

On February 21 [2011], Iraqi police stood by as dozens of
assailants, some wielding knives and clubs, stabbed and
beat at least 20 protesters intending to camp in Tahrir
Square in Baghdad, the capital. During nationwide
demonstrations on February 25, security forces killed at
least 12 protesters across the country and injured more
than 100. Baghdad security forces beat unarmed journalists
and protesters that day, smashing cameras and confiscating
memory cards.

Journalists as intentional targets of repression

A second report, released by Reporters Without Borders (2012)
several days after the Human Rights Watch report (HRW 2012),
documented the perilous nature of reporting in Iraq, noting that
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Iraq’s rank in the global Press Freedom Index dropped in 2011,
after having made remarkable progress in 2009 and 2010. (The
rankings in those prior three years included Kurdistan, a region
that had for many years offered a refuge for journalists
escaping violence in the centre and the south.) This annual
report ranks countries in order of how freely and safely
journalists are able to practice their profession; in 2011 Iraq
fell precipitously from position 130 to position 152.

According to the report (Reporters Without Borders 2012, p. 13):

[J]ournalists are very often the target of violence by the
security forces, whether at demonstrations Tahrir Square in
Baghdad, or in Iraqi Kurdistan, a region that had, for many
years, offered refuge for journalists.

The organization cited a variety of factors in support of this
claim, including increased incidents of the murder of
journalists, most notably Hadi Al-Mahdi, who was shot in the
head in his house in Karrada on 8 September 2011 — the night
before protests against financial and administrative corruption
and lack of services in Iraq. Mahdi, a journalist, was also a
theatre director and a prominent protest organizer who publicly

155

criticized the corruption of government and absence of social
justice.

The negative reports from Human Rights Watch and Reporters
Without Borders were reinforced when the International Crisis
Group (ICG 2011) cited the inefficiency, independence, and
corruption inherent within the state as major contributors to
Iraq’s lawlessness and violence. In the days leading up to 25
February 2011, security forces, military officers, and armed
guards across the country attempted to intimidate would-be
demonstrators by violently attacking (and in one instance
killing) participants in ‘warm-up’ demonstrations, enforcing a
‘no-drive’ zone though Baghdad, and raiding the office of the
Journalistic Freedom Observatory — a non-governmental media
advocacy group.

In spite of these violent pre-emptive attacks, the
demonstrations that began on 25 February involved thousands of
protestors in nearly twenty cities, and journalists shared news
of the attacks instantaneously via social media, in spite of the
additional risk of doing so. The protestors destroyed a number
of government offices and forced the resignation of several
public officials. The protestors’ actions, reported in real time
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by journalists on the ground, caught — and held — the world’s
attention.

Prime Minister Maliki responded almost immediately, as the ICG
(2011, pp. 6-8) explains:

[On] 27 February, Maliki announced a 100-day deadline on
the government to improve service delivery and reduce
corruption. When the 100-day deadline passed, the
government engaged in a campaign to silence its critics,
while it continued to shirk its commitments on governance.
Although poorly attended, the weekly demonstrations in
Baghdad’s Tahrir Square met with a violent response on 10
June when pro-government thugs armed with sticks and knives
attacked protesters. This regime-supported action — police
stood by idly during the attack — carried the unmistakable
threat of continued violence against dissent. Moreover,
during a televised session, the council of ministers
reported on improvements in service delivery during the
previous 100 days, but what was supposed to be an occasion
to celebrate success became an airing of frustrations, with
ministers shouted down by the prime minister.
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The Reporters Without Borders analysis (2012, p. 1) very clearly
indicated that those countries that respect human rights and the
principles of FOE ranked highest, and that this ‘serves as a
reminder that media independence can only be maintained in
strong democracies, and that democracy needs media freedom’.

On 22 April 2011 at 2:20 pm local time, I received the following
e-mail from a protestor and blogger (spelling and punctuation
original):

The details of April 22 attack in Tahreer S.q
It wasn’t the first of its kind there was many before in
Baghdad and all over Iraq the security forces and the
government wants to end the demonstrations in any way
(attacking the protesters one of them)… and attacking the
journalists to keep them away from saying the truth.
I was as usual posting the news from Tahreer Sq in Baghdad
when some young men come to me and ask me about my phone
(Galaxy Tab: its new kind of phones make it easy to connect
to the social media websites) after that they toke the
phone from me and hits me I struggled with them and toke
back my phone. But they become more than 9 persons so I run
to (Aluma) Garden trying to not making them steal my phone
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again...But they are many so I stay down on the ground
holding my phone...
So they come around me and start hit me using their hands
and foots during that I start bleeding and I almost fainted
and while they hitting me I saw the security forces
prevented the protesters from helping me and watching the
gang while they hitting me. And I couldn’t take it so they
toke the phone from me ...and then they run away from
Tahreer Sq...
We told the security forces that they stole the phone go
catch them but they don’t care ...they helped them to run
away from Tahreer Sq and under the eyes of the commander of
the security forces ...and I wasn’t the only one they hit
friends of mine was trying to help me ...
I went with the NGOs activist [name provided in original]
to the officer and we told them what they did (sending
security forces wearing civilian clothes between the
protesters) is a very bad behavior from the government and
your aim is to silence the protesters and his answer was
it’s not my call.
What happened today gave me one lesson there are no such
thing called CHANGE or REFORMING THE REJEM without
sacrifices to speak the truth about what is happening in
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Iraq ...
Is this the new democracy of the new Iraq ...its democracy
full of blood? ...aiming to silence the youth and the press
from saying the truth
what I’m saying now I have god to protect me and I will be
there in Tahreer Sq next Friday posting the news ..
and to my friends who was really good friends to me thank
you so much and be proud for being an Iraqi and be patient
and don’t go to the ways that the bad people wants you to
go to ...don’t use the violence languages ....and it will
be always peaceful demonstrations in Iraq
And here is a big smile from me to you

UNESCO’s global questions regarding social media

In response to the increase of information and communications
technology (ICT) use throughout the world, especially as a tool
for sharing information in defiance of repressive regimes, as
part of World Press Freedom Day 2011 UNESCO posed the following
globally applicable questions:
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§

What are the legal and human rights implications of social
networks on freedom of expression, privacy, and personal
data protection?

§

How can we protect bloggers’ and users’ right to freedom of
expression on the Internet and social networks?

§

How can we find applicable standards and legislation and
share good practices on privacy protection?

§

What is the role of Internet service providers/web hosting
companies? Are they neutral bystanders? And how should we
treat the conflict of jurisdiction created by the transborder nature of the web and social networks?

§

What effects does the new convergence of media have on the
enabling environment for freedom of expression?

While these questions are applicable to citizens of Iraq, or
anywhere for that matter, and they assume even greater
importance when applied to journalists – professionals are
currently taking grave personal risks in order simply to perform
their jobs. UNESCO’s questions must be addressed in light of
journalists as well as citizens if we are to overcome the
fundamental insecurity of journalists – and journalism itself –
in Iraq today.
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Chapter 7
Free media in Iraq: observations and recommendations for
overcoming everyday insecurity for journalists

The lack of a free media in Iraq lies at the root of the
fundamental everyday insecurity journalists there face. As noted
previously (Reporters Without Borders 2012), media independence
and a strong democracy are mutually dependent. Today, Iraq has
neither. A discourse from communiqués received in this research
have revealed: the restraints on journalism, the curtailment of
the free flow of information and the diminishing right to
exercise freedom of expression are being increased by government
and corporations alike.

Critical challenges in brief

Living in Iraq from 2010 through 2012, I witnessed firsthand
many of the most critical issues currently threatening
independent media in Iraq. The most fundamental of these is the
utter lack of security that defines the life of Iraq’s
journalists. To be a journalist in Iraq today, as we have seen,
is to be the target of government surveillance and acts of
censorship and repression that range from inconvenient to
lethal.
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Another aspect of journalists’ insecurity stems from the culture
of impunity enjoyed by government officials, politicians, and
other people in power. With only fledgling journalism laws in
place, none of which reflect global best practice, and outdated
media regulation practices, journalists in Iraq have virtually
none of the protection and support enjoyed by their peers
elsewhere in the world. When journalists in Iraq become victims
of unjust practices, there is a harrowing shortage of human
rights laws in place to keep their circumstances from spiraling
downward.

The lack of independence of the media sector is another
challenge to journalists’ ability to conduct their business in a
safe, fair environment. Iraq’s media sector suffers from a lack
of advertising revenue. Most media houses have no choice but to
be bankrolled for financial dependence by political parties or
factions. This can also afford them a degree of political and
security protection. This financial dependency adversely affects
media workers’ ability to investigate their own political party,
and creates a tendency to report with a pro-party stance. As
Albany Associates (2009 p. 6) note:

163

Journalists face the challenge of reporting on other
parties critically. Those journalists face difficulties
getting information from politicians who are more inclined
to give access to their own media affiliated with their own
organizations.

A final, fundamental challenge to journalists’ security is the
fact that many Iraqi-educated journalists today received a
professional education that was inadequate and outdated, both in
terms of content and equipment. There is an urgent need for a
revised journalism curriculum for higher education and up-todate equipment for media labs in Iraqi journalism departments in
higher education. Such sweeping changes to the curriculum are
essential to building journalistic professionalism in Iraq.
UNESCO’s revised higher education curriculum, created with full
stakeholder participation and launched on 3 May 2012, provides a
useful jumping-off point.

Opportunities for post-conflict interventions

Despite these significant challenges, there is real reason for
hope. Iraq is rich in diversity; it enjoys a multi-party system
and the intelligence to foster a dialogue with the media and
human rights advocacy groups. The international community and
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donors should support such opportunities for positive change,
while keeping in mind three key points. The first of these is
the suggestion that Iraqi media development adopt a far more
consultative approach, with significant stakeholder buy-in, to
assist policymakers, parliamentarians, civil society
organizations (CSOs), local experts, women and youth by
providing support and expertise. Additionally, ingrained,
sustainable frameworks will need to work from the bottom up
(linking small-town journalists to larger media centers) to
create a meaningful sense of local ownership and sustainability.
Finally, all development models originating outside of Iraq (as
the majority of them will) should be evaluated for their
applicability to the Iraqi context rather than applied
unilaterally from other post-conflict settings.

Creating self-regulation and an independent media sector

Similarly, a review of current media legislation and human
rights policy informs the three fundamental recommendations.
First, any new Iraqi media legislation must reflect
international best practices. Second, all legislation must be
created in a transparent manner. Finally, legislation should
support local task forces (such as specially designated
independent oversight bodies made up of a youth parliament,
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women, members of civil society, and local experts and
academics) responsible for acting as oversight bodies, which
should function as entities independent of any governmental or
political interference or control. Currently, oversight bodies
are generally appointed by parliamentary committees in Iraq.

With specific regards to the CMC draft law (CPA Order 65)
currently being reviewed by the COR, I strongly recommend (and
have worked towards) organizing a parliamentary hearing under
the auspices of the United Nations Services and Culture
Committees. The key aims of this meeting would be to:

§

Raise awareness among key policymakers and stakeholders of
the importance of an independent and converged regulator in
Iraq.

§

Support stakeholders in offering expert advice regarding
international best practices of media regulation.

§

Support stakeholders in offering expert advice on the
limitations and positive outcomes of any suggestions
offered at the meeting.

§

Build key policymakers’ and stakeholders’ capacity to draft
legislation (regarding the CMC’s authority and mandate)
aligned with international best practices.
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§

Encourage stakeholders to clarify the respective roles of
the government, the Ministry of Communications (MOC), the
Iraq Media Network (IMN), and the CMC regarding broadcast
policy and regulation.

§

Clarify the CMC’s original mandate as outlined in CPA Order
65, with the aim of consolidating the CMCs responsibility
and function as an independent regulatory body within
Iraq’s current legislative, legal, and political
landscape.

§

Assist stakeholders in nominating and electing a diverse,
representative task force of meeting participants to
continue discussing media regulation in Iraq and
collaborate on drafting regulations as appropriate.

Overcoming the challenges of safety and professional impunity,
access to information, and sustainable media growth

As we have seen, there are many challenges to providing a secure
professional environment for journalists in Iraq. In spite of
what at times seems like an endless list of hurdles to overcome,
there are clear steps that can be taken to improve the ability
of journalists to practice their profession, and to maximize the
potential for media growth in Iraq over time. As a starting
point, all journalists and human rights workers would benefit
167

from improved policy and safety training – and so would members
of the Iraqi Bar Association and Judiciary. Likewise, Iraq could
build capacity and increase support of journalists by building
an educated judiciary regarding civil and political rights, the
right to information, and media law. An educated judiciary, in
turn, is more likely to support truly independent oversight
bodies. Overt media advocacy and support of transparent
judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government will
also serve to mitigate the culture of suspicion in Iraq.

Sustainable development of the media sector hinges on creating
and implementing sustainable business models and creating
revenue through private-sector development. This is a sweeping
statement regarding investment in business that can only be
maximized under the conditions outlined earlier. In brief, it
requires stability and security, lack of corruption,
transparency and RTI, the promotion of regional and
international markets and investors, and the development of an
advertising market that supports independence and a healthy
media market based on the consumer rather than on sectarian
control.

Another facet of creating a sustainable media environment hinges
on improved training for journalists. We have already discussed
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the need for an updated curriculum in schools of journalism;
beyond that, we would be wise to focus on building the
investigative-journalism capacity of targeted groups within
specific fields of expertise over an extended period of time.
Depth of expertise could be developed by training selected media
professionals over time, rather than spending resources on adhoc training in an ever-changing and unstable media environment.
This targeted approach is more cost-effective than striving for
advanced training that is simultaneously broad and deep.
Similarly, the greatest educational impact will be realized by a
focus on improving overall journalistic skills and knowledge
through the Training of Trainers (ToT), as they are the
gatekeepers who edit the stories and ultimately control the
content in the newsroom.

Of course, capacity building extends beyond the newsroom.
Training and supporting media advocacy groups and civil society
in developing proposals and budgets for donor funding, and
advocating with local executive, legal, and judicial branches
and the international community is also strongly advised.

Needs assessment is another area in which positive changes could
be made. There is a need for consultation with local groups and
individuals to assess the actual needs of media practitioners
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and the beneficiaries of media, as well as with the faculty at
all media colleges and other sources of higher education in
journalism with the specific goal of outfitting them with up-todate technology.

Finally, there are many ways to improve RTI/FOI in Iraq,
including developing and legislating a Right to Information Act
in accordance with international best practice; this would also
help support and protect the nascent culture of investigative
journalism in Iraq. Similarly, the right to information and
freedom of information for civil society and journalists alike
would be supported by the development, legislation, and
implementation of a full, free, public archival and retrieval
system.

Lastly, the efforts of the media, civil society, authorities,
and the international community could be coordinated and
enhanced through the creation of a globally accessible ‘gateway’
or ‘platform’.

This would act as a vehicle for practitioners to

share experiences, tools, mandates, and in particular, lessons
learned.
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Developing a sustainable, locally owned Iraqi media that
respects diversity and human rights

If Iraq is ever going to fall in line with the international
media community, it needs to focus on fostering sustainable
media development and a sense of local ownership of media in
Iraq, within a context that respects and protects
internationally recognized human rights.

A fundamental task in

this regard will be ensuring that all members of parliament,
employees of the Iraqi government, members of the Iraqi Bar
Association, and leaders of key institutions (banks, educational
organizations, and cultural or community groups) maintain up-todate, thorough training on media law and civil and human rights
as an expected professional requirement. These parties’ active
participation in these issues should be encouraged in numerous
ways, including through specialized task forces charged with
monitoring policy and human rights violations. In a similar
vein, great care should be taken to ensure existing oversight
bodies (the CMC, the Human Rights Commission, and the High
Electoral Commission) maintain their independence from the
executive or judicial branches of government.

In developing a sustainable free media, special attention should
be given to diversity of participants as well as sponsors. To
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this end, efforts should be made to increase civil-society
participation, especially of women, youth and other vulnerable
communities, in democratic processes related to media,
elections, human rights, and civil liberties. Diversity of all
types (religious, gender, political, etc.) should also be
enhanced at all levels and in all positions within media
organizations.

One way to address both aspects of diversity would be to
establish and maintain community centers with radio and media
facilities in all Governorates of Iraq, with a special focus on
women, youth, and minority groups. The primary function of these
centers would be to foster dialogue and the sharing of
information regarding elections, social issues, politics and
other critical concerns. These centers should be managed and
maintained by locally based media professionals, CSOs, and
should remain open between elections, to ensure the
sustainability of the centers and emphasize Iraq’s support for
regular public discussion of elections and other sociopolitically and culturally ‘newsworthy’ issues.

In addition, public-sector modernization is needed in creating a
market that supports media self-reliance and independence, and
efforts should be made to build the capacity for media outlet
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management, and to support media managers in identifying and
securing diverse, sustainable, and independent funding sources.

Developing a code of conduct for media during elections

Our last consideration is essential to protecting the security
of journalists across Iraq: the need for an official Code of
Conduct for media during and around elections. Ensuring Iraqi
elections follow standardized and internationally accepted
reporting practices must be a top priority. The Code of Conduct
should be developed in coordination with the IHEC, the CMC, and
the media itself. It must include a detailed guide on media
incitement, stipulate that all candidates shall have equal air
time, and provide a clear definition of the ‘silence period’
during which media stop broadcasting campaign-related news
immediately (24 to 48 hours) prior to an election.

All of these efforts will move Iraq immeasurably closer to a
sustainable free media in which it can take pride. The tasks
outlined above would complement the revisions necessary to
strengthen regulatory frameworks relating to Article 19 (FOE and
FOI) and pre-existing laws such as the Publication Law and Penal
Code.
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Beyond initiating amendments to what are often described as
‘tyrannical’ pre-existing laws, a discerning eye should be
thrown over all areas of legislation alluding to ‘media’ or
‘freedom of expression’ (not merely the more obvious laws, such
as those detailed in Chapter 5). An example of this is the draft
Terrorism Law, in which one finds large tracts of provisions
that hold media in the grip of legislation that targets,
suppresses, or restricts the freedom to practice their
profession with the independence enjoyed by their colleagues in
other countries.

The aforementioned challenges – and certainly others, as well –
permeate every aspect of Iraq’s current media environment. They
must be addressed individually but simultaneously viewed through
a holistic lens in order to remove the multilayered threats to
the everyday security of journalists working in contemporary
Iraq.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion

As this Exegesis has made clear, there is room for improvement
not only in establishing a free media in Iraq, but first in
creating the enabling environment a free and independent media
requires. Iraq’s current post-conflict environment and its
legacy of a totalitarian regime pose undeniable challenges to
this process. Among the most pervasive of these are the
fundamental insecurities faced by journalists, including but not
limited to threats, imprisonment, torture, and death.
Furthermore, I hope this Exegesis and the accompanying
exhibition have made it clear to the audience that, despite the
extreme obstacles to FOE in Iraq, the energy and bravery of
those exercising these rights is remarkable.

Although Saddam Hussein is no longer in power, his influence
remains evident in the government's attitude toward FOE and FOI
laws and practices, and in the notion that woefully inadequate
and/or outdated laws are somehow still applicable or useful in
contemporary Iraq. For example, as detailed in Chapter 5, a
number of conceptually important draft laws have been presented,
including the Draft Law on Media and Telecommunications, the
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Draft Law on Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Peaceful
Protest, and the Draft Law on Information Technology Crimes.
While the actual content of these draft laws is gravely and
fundamentally flawed, the laws might serve as placeholders (if
nothing else) for improved versions written by teams of betterqualified people who have a sincere interest in investing in FOE
and FOI in Iraq. These teams would certainly include legal
experts; they would benefit as well from the input of
journalists and journalism scholars from throughout the region
and around the world.

Likewise, with the exponential increase in the use of social
media by everyday citizens and professional journalists alike,
the writing is on the wall: time is quickly running out for
those powerbrokers who would cling to a rapidly disappearing era
in which information only existed in hard copy and was therefore
relatively easy to control. The number of users of cell phones,
text messages, camera phones (still and video), and social media
— and the almost incalculably larger number of individual
communications — will soon render such control of content
virtually impossible, regardless of what archaic, oppressive, or
inadequate laws are on the books. Strategic powerbrokers would
be wise to get out in front and lead this inevitable
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technological wave, rather than stand on the beach cursing it
until it sweeps them out to sea.

In November of 2012, UNESCO called on all United Nations bodies
and international partners to participate in renewed efforts to
defend FOE, designating Iraq as one of five focus countries most
in need of international intervention. The global implementation
strategy for 2013-2014 outlined in the UN Plan of Action on the
Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity (UNESCO 2012)
calls for a united front in defending FOE as an internationally
recognized human right. The strategy outlined in this UN plan
stresses the need for local participation and advocacy as well
as global, international action in redesigning the oppressive
legal framework that threatens the security of journalists and
citizens in Iraq today. The only way such a strategy can succeed
is through participation and action at all levels of society,
from the grassroots community to the institutions that uphold
and safeguard the rule of law.

In addition to this approach, additional academic research
(likely in the form of a PhD dissertation) would enhance our
understanding of the situation I observed over two years on the
ground in Iraq. Topics for further research include:
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1. An in-depth analysis that reflects in detail the ways in
which macro-level issues around the legal framework
governing the formation of an independent media in Iraq are
directly related to the micro-level issues around the
personal safety of journalists in Iraq. This analysis will
require additional research in Iraq. It is a worthwhile yet
problematic area to analyze – due to issues of access and
security - as accurate statistics are not freely available.
2. An in-depth application of CDA in looking at FOE in Iraq
and the inter-linked repercussions shaping public discourse
and social action between the individual, the social and
the institution (legal, political and military) and the
impact that this has at both micro and macro-level on civil
liberties and security associated with FOE.
3. An in-depth comparative analysis, which reflects in detail
the ways in which macro-level issues around the legal
framework governing the formation of an independent media
in post-conflict situations outside of Iraq, are directly
related to the micro-level issues around the personal
safety of journalists in those settings.
a. Examining scenarios with similar socio-political links
as Iraq (such as Kosovo) where sectarian media control
in conflict and post-conflict settings remains a major
challenge to media independence.
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b. Widening the analysis to look at global legal
frameworks as they pertain to media law and regulation
and their impact on journalists in situ.
4. An in-depth study of global examples of post-war
reconstruction efforts and interventions as they pertain to
fostering media freedom and measuring their success rates.
5. Finally, taking the research to a global level of analysis
to explore whether the development of press freedom in
post-conflict scenarios has a direct impact or link on
democracy building. This global analysis should take into
account the current international trend of diminishing
access to information and right to privacy in first world
democracies as imposed by both democratically elected
governments and corporations.

Despite the substantive challenges that make Iraqi media
professionals’ work both difficult and dangerous, there are
other, very real reasons for hope — reasons that lie in the
rapidly expanding knowledge and experience base of the Iraqi
people, civil society and policy makers and in their willingness
to challenge a system that has oppressed them for years.

Awad and Eaton (2013, p. 4) reiterate this belief:
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… the Iraqi media landscape of 2013 may not be the free,
plural and professional fourth estate that many in the West
had envisaged in 2003, but it has real strengths – as well
as weaknesses – which reflect the reality and complexity of
modern Iraq.

The Iraqis' spirit of bravery, sense of justice, and dedication
to fighting for those rights that are enjoyed by journalists and
citizens throughout much of the world is what, ultimately, might
prove to be the most powerful weapon of all in their struggle.

Perhaps, to quote Peter Finch's character in the Academy Award
winning film, Network (Lumet 1976), Iraqi citizens and
journalists are simply ‘as mad as hell, and [they are] not going
to take this anymore’. When these convictions are coupled with
the intellectual and logistical support of the international
community of journalists and legal teams experienced in
establishing internationally relevant and acceptable FOE and FOI
laws in post-conflicts settings, it seems the state of FOE and
FOI in Iraq can only improve.

The observations and suggestions made here are intended to build
on a process already underway and being carried out — not only
in conference rooms and board rooms, but online and in the
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streets of Iraq — by committed journalists and supportive
professionals from the international community, and by countless
Iraqi citizens whose devotion to a better future is matched only
by their bravery in the struggle.
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